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The fare paid by a passenger to a carrier includes the transportation of his baggage;
and the carrier has a lien thereon for the fare, and may detain the same until payment thereof.
R. purchased an unconditional ticket for a passage on the 0. & C. Railway from
Portland to Ashland, and after his ticket had been taken up by the conductor, stopped
over at Grant's Pass without his consent, leaving his baggage, consisting of a large
valise, to be carried on to Ashland, where it was taken charge of by the employees
of the road ; on the next day R. got on the train to Ashland but refused to pay the
fare thereto, $1.79 ; when the conductor allowed him to remain on the train, but
refused to deliver him his valise at Ashland until he paid the additional fare: Reld,
that the journey from Portland to Ashland was performed under one contract, modified by the action of R. in stopping over, whereby he incurred an additional charge
for his transportation, for which the carrier had a lien on the baggage so long as it
remained in his possession.

Edward B. Watson, for the plaintiff.
Earl . .Bronaugh,for the defendant.
DEADY, J.-This action was brought against the defendant, the
receiver of the Oregon and California railway, to recover damages
for alleged maltreatment of the plaintiff, while travelling on the road
between Portland and Ashland, Oregon.
The cause was tried with a jury, who gave a verdict for the
defendant; and is now before the court on a motion for a new trial.
It appeared on the trial that the plaintiff purchased from the defendant a combination ticket from Portland to San Francisco, where he
resided, and started on the south-bound 0. & 0. train, on July 13th
1885; that about 200 miles south of Portland the conductor cut
off from said combination ticket and took up the coupon entitling
the plaintiff to transportation on the railway between Portland and
Ashland, a distance of about 300 miles, and gave him his private
check for future identification; that at Grant's Pass, a station some
miles south of Roseburg, the plaintiff was left behind, and a large
leather valise belonging to him was carried on the train to Ashland.
The next passenger train going south passed Grant's Pass in the
evening of July 14th, and the plaintiff got on the same, when the
conductor, in obedience to the rules of the company, demanded his
fare to Ashland ($1.79), which the plaintiff refused to pay, alleging
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that he had paid his fare once and had been left behind by the
misconduct of the conductor on the train of the day previous; to
which the conductor replied that he would give him a receipt for
the payment, and if his statement proved correct the money would
be refunded to him. The plaintiff still refused to pay and suggested
to the conductor that he might put him off the car, to which the
latter replied that he would hold his valise for the fare. When the
tiain arrived at Ashland the plaintiff attempted to take his valise
out of the office where it had been deposited the day before, which
the conductor resisted, and with the aid of a brakeman finally prevented.
The plaintiff in his testimony attributed his being left at Grant's
Pass to the misconduct of the conductor, in starting the train without warning and without waiting the usual time. But on the whole
evidence it was so manifest that 'his testimony was grossly and wilfully false in this respect, and that he was left in consequence of
his own wilfulness in leaving the train just as it was about to start,
and after he was warned of the fact, and going some distance from
the track to get something to eat, that his counsel abandoned the
claim for damages on that account before the jury, and only asked
a verdict for the alleged mistreatment of the plaintiff at Ashland
in the struggle for the possession of the valise.
The court instructed the jury that if they believed the plaintiff's
statement about vhe affray at Ashland, arising out of his attempt to
possess himself of the valise, they ought to find a verdict for him;
but if they did not believe it, and were satisfied that the conductor
used only such force as was necessary and proper to prevent the
plaintiff from taking the valise out of the possession of the defendant without first paying the extra fare, they ought to find for the
defendant.
In this connection the court also instructed the jury that under
the circumstances the defendant had a lien on the plaintiff's valise
for his fare from Grant's Pass to Ashland, on July the 14th, and
therefore the conductor had a right to retain the possession of the
same until such fare was paid.
To this latter instruction counsel for the plaintiff then excepted,
and now asks for a new trial on account thereof.
A carrier of passengers is responsible as a common carrier for the
baggage of a passenger, when carried on the same conveyance as
the owner thereof. The transportation of the baggage and the risk
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incurred by the carrier is a part of the service for which the fare is
charged: Hollister v. Nowlen, 19 Wend. 236; Cole v. Goodwin,
Id. 257; Powell v. Myers, 25 Id. 594; Merrill v. Grennell, 30
N. Y. 609; Burnell v. N. Y. Cent. Ry., 45 Id. 186; Thomp. Car.
Passengers 520,. sect. 8; Story on Bail., sect. 499.
Correspondingly, a carrier of passengers has a lien on the baggage
that a passenger carries with him for pleasure or convenience :
Overton on Liens, sect. 142; Thomp. Car. Passengers 524, sect.
11: Angell on Car., § 375: 2 Rorer on Rys. 1008, sect. 11. But
this lien does not extend to the clothing or other personal furnishings
or conveniences of the passenger in his immediate use or actual
possession: Ramsden v. Boston & Albany Ry., 104 Mass. 121.
A ticket for transportation on a railway between certain termini,
which is silent as to the time when or within which it may be used,
does not authorize the holder to stop over at any point between such
termini and resume his journey thereon on the next or any following
train. The contract involved in the sale and purchase of such a
ticket is an entire one and not divisible. It is a contract to carry
the passenger through to the point of his destination as one continuous service, and not by piecemeal, to suit his convenience or
pleasure: 2 Rorer on Rys. 971, sect. 10 ; 2 Wood's Ry. Law, sect.
847; Oleveland, &e., By. v. Bartram, 10_Ohio St. 457; Drew v.
0. P. By., 51 Cal. 425.
Admiting these legal propositions, counsel for the plaintiff insists
that the defendant had no lien on the valise in question, and therefore no right to retain it. And in support of this proposition he
ingeniously argues that the journey from here to Ashland was
divided into two distinct parts-one from Portland to Grant's Pass
on July 13th, for which his fare was paid to Ashland, and on which
the valise went through to that point; and one from said Pass to
Ashland, on which, although no fare was paid yet no baggage was
carried.
Before considering this proposition it is well to remember that the
undertaking of the company to transport this valise, as baggage,
was only incidental to the principal undertaking to carry the owner
thereof, and when the latter was performed or discharged the former
was also. Therefore, if the journey in reference to which the
defendant undertook to carry the same, ended, by the act of the
plaintiff, at Grant's' Pass the carriage of the valise from there to
Ashland on the same train was an additional service performed for
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him, for which the defendant was entitled to an additional compensation as the carrier of so much freight, and had a lien thereon for
the same; for a traveller is not entitled to have hispersonal baggage
carried in consideration of the fare paid by him, unless it is on the
same train which carries him: Thomp. Car. Passengers 521, sect. 8.
But, in my judgment, the transaction must be regarded, for the
purpose of this question, as one journey, in the course of which the
plaintiff incurred an additional charge of $1.79 for transportation.
In effect, the plaintiff paid his fare to Ashland on the train of July
13th, with the privilege of stopping over at Grant's Pass and finishing the journeyon the next day's train on the payment of the extra
charge of $1.79. He saw proper to avail himself of this privilege,
and thereby became indebted to the defendant accordingly. And
whether the plaintiff allowed his baggage to be carried through on
the first train or kept it with him, the defendant had a lien on it for
all the unpaid charges for transportation which the plaintiff incurred
during the journey. There was but one contract for the transportation of the plaintiff, including his baggage, which was modified
or altered in the courseof its performance by his own act or omission.
Suppose there were first and second-class carriages on this road,
and on July 13th the plaintiff paid his fare and took passage in one
of the latter for Ashland, but, arriving at Grant's Pass he got into
one of the former and rode to Ashland, refusing to pay the additional fare, when demanded-can there be any doubt that the defendant would have a lien on his baggage for the same, and might, if he
had or got possession of it, retain it until such fare was paid?
Certainly not.
Substantially, this is the parallel of the plaintiff's case. The
defendant was clearly in the right in detaining the valise until the
ILre was paid, and the plaintiff was as clearly in the wrong in
attempting to take it without doing so. Indeed, his conduct throughout this transaction looks very much like he was playing a game to
involve the defendant in a lawsuit, out of which he might make
some money.
The motion for a new trial is disallowed.
We have read this case with much
interest ; and upon such consideration as
we have been able to bestow upon it, are
unable to coincide with the conclusion
therein stated. While it is true that the

fare paid by a passenger to a carrier
includes the transportation of his baggage,
and that the carrier has a lien thereon for
the fare and may detain the same until
the payment thereof ( Wolf v. Suinmers,
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2 Camp. 631 ; Story on Bail., sect. 604;
Hutchinson on Car., sect. 719), in our
judgment the principal case is not a
proper one for the application of this
rule. This lien of the carrier, is only
a particular and specific lien, as distinguished from what is known as a general
lien: Hutchinson on Car., sect. 477. It
will bo conceded that the owner of the
baggage must stand in the relation of
passenger to the carrier in order to fix
upon the latter liability as a carrier of
baggage; the carriage of baggage is ex
vi termini incidental to the carriage of the
owner as a passenger ; if, therefore, that
which would have been properly baggage
had it been acdompanied by the owner
as a passenger, should by accident or
mistake be accepted by the carrier for
transportation without being accompanied by the owner, and when he is not or
does not become a passenger, the carrier
would not have it in his custody in the
character of baggage and would not be
responsible for it as such : Hutchinson on
Car., sect. 701 ; The EltiraHarbeck, 2
Blatch. 336"; Collins v. Rd., 10 Cush.
506 ; Fairfax v. Rd., 37 N. Y. S. C.
516, and 40 Id. 128 ; a. c. 67 N. Y. 11.
In the case of Collins v. Rd., supra,
the agent of the carrier inquired, when
the goods were offered as baggage by the
owner, whether he intended to accompany
thet ; and upon his answering that he
did, the goods were accepted. The owner,
however, went upon a subsequent train;
the goods were stolen before the arrival
of the owner; in delivering their opinion
the court, per DEwny, J., said : "It is
easy to perceive that the omission of the
plaintiff to accompany them, as he informed the defendant's agent he should,
contributed materially to the loss, as that
which might have been a very proper and
suitable disposition of them at the station
at Lawrence, under the reasonable belief
that the owner of them was present to take
charge of them, might have been one of
hazard and exposure to loss in his
absence."
It was accordingly held that
VOL. XXXV.-38

the carrier was not liable. It should be
remembered, however, that where the
relation of carrier and passenger exists,
it is not necessary that the passenger
-should travel upon the same train with
the baggage. Thus, where the passenger
having purchased a ticket over the defendant's road cannot procure his baggage in
time for transportation upon the same
train with him, and the agent of the road
thereupon agrees to forward it by the
next train, the railroad in such case
assumes the ordinary liability of a carrier for baggage of the passenger on the
same train : Warner v. Ad., 22 Iowa
166. If, however, the baggage is left
behind by the passenger in the absence
of any agreement as to its subsequent
carriage, and it is subsequently transported by the carrier, it will, it seems, be
carried as freight, not as baggage : Wilson v. Ry., 57 Me. 138; Graffan v. Rd.,
67 Id. 234.
It is held also that the passenger may
allow his baggage to precede him to its
destination while he lies over upon the
route; and in such case the carrier must
safely keep the baggage at the end of the
route until he calls for it or until the lapse
of a reasonable time; and until the lapse
of such time the carrier is liable as a
common carrier: Logan.v. Ry., IL Rob.
(La.) 24; Chicago, 4-c., Rd. v. Fairdough, 52 Il. 106 ; Pierce's Rd. L. 499;
Hutchinson on Car., sect. 7.06..
It may also be considered as settled
that, as stated by the court in the principal case, a ticket between certain termini which is silent as to the time of user,
does not authorize the holder to stop over
at any point between such termini and
resume his journey thereon on the next
or any following train. The contract
involved in the sale and purchase of such
a ticket, is an entire one and not divisible ; it is a contract to carry the passenger through to the point of his destination
as one continuous service, and not by
piecemeal to suit his convenience or
pleasure. Besides the authorities cited
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by the court, see, also, Oil Creek Ry. v.
Clark, 72 Penn. St. 231 : Churchill v.
Rd., 67 Ill. 390 ; McClure v. Rd., 34
Md. 532 ; Cheney v. Rd. 11 Met. 121
State v. Overton, 24 N. J. Law 435.
It has been held that where the passenger has paid his fare and engaged a particular seat in a stage-coach, the carrier
cannot dispose of the place upon the passenger's not appearing at the outset of
the journey to take it, but must hold it
for him ; and the passenger may take the
seat at any stage of the journey : Ker
V. Mountain, I Esp. 27.
The principles above stated seem clear;
indeed, none of them are controverted by
the court in the principal case. In the
application of them, however, to the
principal case, it seems to us that the
argument of the counsel for the plaintiff
is conclusive. It must be conceded, we
think, that it was not within the power
of the railroad company to compel the
plaintiff to continue a passenger throughout the whole extent of the trip ; the
railway company, as it seems to us, had
no just cause of complaint that it was
not called upon to peribrm all that it was
legally compellable to do under its contract with the plaintiff. It must be conceded, however, that when the plaintiff
resumed his journey, he entered into a
new relation with the carrier and was
therefore liable for the payment of fare
from the point where he resumed his
journey to his destination. The plaintiff's contention with the company at this
point was, that he should be carried without the payment of additional fare ; this
claim was denied by the company, who
rightfully claimed that the service performed was an additional service under
a distinct contract; if this service was an
additional service under a distinct contract under which the carrier was entitled
to additional compensation, it follows

as a matter of course, that there was
no lieu upon the baggage of the plaintiff for such carriage, for the reason
that the carrier's lien is, as we have
stated, a particular and not a general
lien; and, because the contracts were
distinct, if the baggage had been transported by the company upon the same
train upon which the residue of the plaintiff's journey was performed, there would
be no doubt as to the existence of the lien
claimed. The statement of the court,
however, that the transaction must be
regarded for the purpose of this question,
as one journey, in the course of which
the plaintiff incurred an additional charge
of $1.79 for transportation, does not
seem to be consistent with the above conclusions. The railroad company had a
right, if it saw fit, to waive its right to
insist that the carriage should be continuous ; but it could not at the same time
waive its rights and insist upon them. If
the carriage of the plaintiff to his destination is to be regarded as a carriage
under the original contract, the railway
company clearly was not entitled to any
further compensation ; if, on the other
hand, it is regarded as a separate and
distinct contract, which it must be conceded to be, since the railway company
has so treated it by demanding additional
compensation, then the carriage was not
performed under the original contract
but under a new contract, and in such
case it seems to follow that the particular
lien which the law gives to the carrier
upon baggage transported by the same
train, cannot be made a general lien so
as to secure the fare due from the passenger upon another contract.
These propositions seem to us to be
conclusive, and we cannot but think the
case was erroneously decided.
M. D. EwELL.
Chicago.
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Suprene Court of Michigan.
ATTOINEY-GENERAL v. RICE.
When nothing appears to the contrary in the legislative journals, it is to be considered that all the constitutional requirements have been complied with in the passage
of an act by the general assembly.
The journals of the houses of a Jegislature are conclusive evidence of their proceedings, which cannot he contradicted by parol testimony.
Courts do not allow parties to stipulate or agree or admit by pleading that a
statute was not properly or constitutionally passed by the legislature.

If the constitution has not been complied with in the passage of an act, that fact
must be shown by the printed journals or by the certificate of the secretary of state,
or by the proper custodian of the legislative proceedings. Such fact cannot rest in
parol.
Unless the journals show affirmatively that the constitutional directions were not
complied with it must be presumed that they were followed.
Courts are authorized to take judicial knowledge of the legislative journals.

Quo WARRANTO.
Information to determine right of respondent to hold office.
The Attorney-General(Olds & Bobson, of counsel), for appellant.
Luciu8 D. Johnson, for respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
RIORSE, J.-The attorney-general files an information in this case
to determine the right of the respondent to hold the office of supervisor of township of Ironwood in the county of Ontonagon.
The legislature of 1885 (Act No, 23, of the session laws of
1885) organized certain territory in Ontonagon county into a township, to be called Ironwood. At an election held pursuant to the
provisions of said act, on the sixth day of July 1885, the respondent
was elected supervisor of said township, and duly qualified, and
entered upon the duties of his office. No election was held in said
township in the spring of 1886, and the respondent claims to hold
over under the 'statute until his successor has been duly elected and
qualified, in manner and form as provided by statute. 1 How. St.
685. The organization of this township is attacked on the ground
that no bill was legally introduced or enacted as a statute creating
the township of Ironwood.
The replication of the attorney-general to the plea of the respondent shows that no bill of the organization of the township of Iron-
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wood was ever introduced into the legislature, but, before the expiration of the constitutional limit of fifty days in which to introduce
bills, Senator Stephenson introduced a skeleton bill, under the title
of " a bill to organize the township of Au Train; that said skeleton
bill was no bill at all, and simply consisted of the title as above
given, endorsed on a blank sheet of paper; that said township of
An Train was to be located in Alger county. After the expiration
of said fifty days, and on June 3d 1885, the chairman on senate
committee on town and counties reported, as a substitute for the
skeleton bill so introduced by Senator Stephenson, a bill to organize
the township of Ironwood in the county of Ontonagon, and that
on the same day the rules of the senate were suspended, and said
bill, as a manuscript bill, was passed by the senate. Subsequently,
it passed the house, and was approved by the governor, June 9th
1885. The replication was demurred to by respondent.
The attorney-general contends that the constitution was violated
in its spirit, because the title of the bill as introduced did not express
the object of the act as passed. Article 4, 20. We cannot extend
the provisions of the constitution beyond its express terms in this
respect.
If the object of the act as passed is fully expressed in its title,
the form of status of such title at its introduction, or during any
of the stages of legislation before it becomes a law, is immaterial.
To hold otherwise would, in many cases, prevent any alteration or
amendment of a bill after its introduction, as, in legislative practice,
it frequently becomes necessary to amend the title as introduced in
order to conform to changes in the bill. The title to a bill is usually
adapted after it has passed the house, and is not an essential part
of the bill, although it is of a law. Larrison v. Peoria, A. J. D.
Bd., 77 Ill. 17. The showing of the replication, however, if we
can consider the fact therein gathered by parol, and not found in the
legislative records, involves the plain violation of the constitution in
another respect. No bill was introduced, but a title was handled
up to pass as a bill until convenience or some future interest might
enable the member introducing it to ingraft upon it any legislation
he might desire.
The object of the constitution providing that no new bill shall be
introduced after the first fifty days of the session is to "prevent
hasty and improvident legislation, and to compel, so far as any
previous law can accomplish that result, the careful examination of
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proposed laws, or, at least, the affording of opportunity for that
purpose." Cooley, Const. Tim. (1st ed.) 139. Another purpose
was, no doubt, to give the people of the state, or of any locality in
the state, an opportunity to be heard upon proposed legislation
affecting their interest. The legislative journals, referring as they
do to the titles of all bills introduced, gives some warning to the
people of the measures introduced. The right of petition and protest has ever been recognised as one of the established privileges
of the people in a free country ; and they have a right to notice of
proposed legislation and an opportunity to express their assent or
dissent. If there was no constitutional inhibition against such
practice, bills might be introduced upon the last days of the session,
and rushed at once through both houses, without any chance for the
people to be heard before their passage, or to rectify the action until
another biennial session of the legislature. The title of the bill in
question as introduced gave no notice to the inhabitants of the territory embraced within the limits of this township of Ironwood as
organized by this act. And if any person suspecting anything of
the kind had investigated the matter before the expiration of the
fifty days, he would have found nothing but a title which, without
any bill attached thereto, would have conveyed to him no intimation
of the act as passed. He would also have been justified, under the
provisions of the constitution, in believing that the title could not
be used for any purpose.
While the questionable practice of so amending bills, after the
expiration of the fifty-day limit, as to make the act passed entirely different from and foreign to the bill introduced, in fact a new bill, has
obtained to a great extent in our legislative practice, it is to be hoped
that the introducing of mere titles without any body, is seldom
resorted to. If it can be successfully maintained, the safeguard
of the constitution will be completely broken down, and its provisions nullified. But it is contended by the counsel for respondent
that the proceedings of the senate, as set forth in its journal, does
not show that this was a skeleton bill, as the bills introduced are
not printed in such journal, or preserved, and that this fact is ascertained by parol; that the presumption is always in favor of the
legality of legislative proceedings, and, where the record does not
show the contrary, the proceedings are conclusively presumed to
have been in accordance with the constitutional requirements.
The legislative journals show that on the 16th day of Febru-
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ary 1885, a bill was introduced " to organize the township of Au
Train," which was read a first and second time by its title, and
referred to the committee on counties and townships. The first
day of the session was January 7th 1885. June 3d 1885, this
committee reported, as a substitute for this bill, a bill to organize
the township of Ironwood, county of Ontonagon; the substitute
was concurred in, the rule suspended, and the same read a third
time and passed, yeas 25 and nays 0. Senate Journal, p. 120. It
was transmitted to the house on the same day, and there read the
first and second time by its title, and referred to the committee on
towns and counties. House Journal, 1604. It was reported back
to the house by committee, and June 7th 1885, the rules were suspended, the bill read a third time, and passed. It was also given
immediate effect. House Journal, 1652-1658. It was approved
by the governor, and became a law June 9th 1885.
Every reasonable intendment is to be made in favor of the proceedings of the legislature. It is not to be presumed that they
have violated the provisions of the constitution, either purposely or
through carelessness or inadvertence. When nothing appears to
the contrary in the legislative journals, it is to be considered that
all the constitutional requirements have been complied with in the
passage of an act. The journal of the senate postively states that
a bill was introduced to organize the township of Au Train. If
such a bill was introduced, it would be presumed that the bill substituted to organize the township of Ironwood had in view the same
general purpose as the first bill, to give to the inhabitants of the
territory described a distinct municipal government. And no one
would deny the competency of the legislature to amend a bill by
enlarging or diminishing the bounds of the territory included in such
bill. Pack v. Barton, 47 Mich. 521; s. 0. 11 N. W. Rep. 367.
The question then arises, can it be shown by parol, in contradiction of the legislative journal, that in fact a "skeleton bill, or no
bill at all, was introduced ?" The constitution provides that "each
house shall keep a journal of its proceedings and publish the same,
except such parts as may require secrecy." Are these journals
kept by the clerks of each house, and read and corrected each day
by each body, and duly certified by the proper officers to be correct,
to stand as conclusive evidence of their proceedings, or are they
liable to be disputed and overthrown by parol testimony, either of
individual officers and members, or of strangers who may be inter-
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ested in nullifying legislative action ? It would seem that there
can be but one answer. The legislative record must prevail. Any
other ruling would necessarily lead to dangerous and alarming
results. "The testimony of an individual could not be received to
contradict a statute, and, if not, why receive it to contradict an entry
upon the journal?" State v. M offitt, 5 Ohio 863; Miller v. State,
8 Ohio St. 476, 484.
It is claimed by the attorney-general that it is admitted on the
pleadings that no bill was ever introduced; but that the title
endorsed upon a piece of blank paper was put in. Courts do not
allow parties to stipulate or agree, or admit by pleading that a
statute was not properly or constitutionally passed by the legislature.
If the constitution has not been complied with in the passage of an
act, that fact must be shown by the printed journals, or the certificate of the secretary of state, the custodian of legislative proceedings. Such fact cannot rest in parol. Rappel v. Brethauer, 70
Ill. 166 ; Miller v. State, 3 Ohio St. 476. And unless the journal
shows affirmatively that the constitutional directions were not complied with, it must be presumed that they were followed. Schuyler
Co. v. People, 25 Ill. 181.
Courts are authorized to take judicial knowledge of the legislative
journals. The journals in this case show that the bill was read the
first and second time in both houses by its title only. The attorneygeneral contends that this action was in violation of article 4, sect.
19, of the constitution, which provides that "every bill and joint
resolution shall be read three times in each house before the passage
thereof." It is a sufficient answer to this objection that the same
is not set out or raised in the pleadings. We do not care to go outside of the record to hunt for laws in the legislative journal upon
the passage of this bill, if any exists.
It appears that the Board of Supervisors of Ontonagon county,
since the passage of this act, have undertaken to form two townships,
Bessmer and Ironwood, the territory of which townships, so organized by the supervisors, embraces the territory contained in the township of Ironwood, as organized by the legislature. The petition,
however, upon which the supervisors acted in organizing such townships, was signed by persons representing themselves citizens and
freeholders of the townships of Carp Lake and Ontonagon. Such
action cannot stand in the way of the legislative organization. No
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freeholders of the township of Ironwood joined in the petition, as
shown upon its face. How. St. sect. 486.
Judgment-must be rendered in favor of the respondent, sustaining
his demurrer, and declaring him entitled to the office.
The other justices concurred.
The courts are far from unanimity on
the subject of investigation to see if an
act of the legislature has been passed by
that body in accordance with all of the
requirements of the constitution. The
main line of division is drawn at the
point where a bill duly filed in the office
provided by law for its custody is signed
by the presiding officers of both houses
and by the chief executive of the state.
In some courts inquiry beyond this point
is not permitted ; in others it is.
If we will turn to the English cases on
this subject we will receive some aid.
The leading case is Rex v. Arundd, Hobart 110. It appeared that a bill had
passed the House of Lords and been sent
to the Lower House, and thence returned
with a certain proviso annexed to it.
The bill was filed with the rest of the
bills, and was marked with the royal
assent. As it was a private bill it was
not enrolled in the Court of Chancery,
as was the usage with acts of a public
nature. The attempt was made in the
Court of Chancery to show by the journal
of the House of Lords that the proviso,
which was omitted in the copy filed, had
passed as a part of the bill. The court
resolved that the journal could not be
used as evidence for that purpose ; and
drew a distinction between an infirmity
appearing in the act itself, as where it
purported to have been passed without
the concurrence of the Commons, and a
defect revealed by the journal ; the former
being regarded as an incurable imperfection ; the latter as an objection impossible,
according to the laws of evidence, to be
proven.
So when a defendant, before Lord
HALF. pleaded that a bill had never
received the royal assent, he was not per-

mitted to raise the question, HALE holding
that the certificate of the bill from the
Court of Chancery, where it had been
recorded, was conclusive. College of
Physicians and Cooperv. Hubert, 3 Keb.
587.
This doctrine has received the sanction
of Lord CoKE: 12 Rep. 58; see Rex v.
Jeffries, 1 Str. 446 ; Rex v. Robotham,
3 Burr. 1472. "It is believed that the
English cases are, without exception, to
the same effect-that the roll, called here
the enrolled act, imports absolute verity,
and therefore cannot be questioned."
Evans v. Browne, 30 Ind. 514.
In several states no inquiry beyond the
enrolled act, properly signed by the presiding officers of both houses and the governor, as found on file in the secretary of
state's office, is allowed. The production
of such a document is conclusive evidence
that the act was passed by the legislature. This ruling is placed upon at least
two distinct grounds. The first is that
the legislature has adopted a mode of
certifying its own acts in an authentic
form; and when certified in that form it
is conclusive evidence of the passage of
the act. In a case where the bill had appended to it the signature of the presiding
officers of each house, it was said : "In
its present form it was exhibited to the
governor as the bill which had been enacted, and as such received his approval,
as is evidenced by his signature. It was
then immediately made public by being
filed in the office of the secretary of state.
These are the sanctions which the legislature has provided for the authentication
of their own acts, both to the public and
to the judicial tribunals-and the question
is therefore presented whether such anthentication must not be deemed conclu-
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sive, or, in other words, whether the
legislature does not possess the right of
declaring what shall be the supreme evidence of the authenticity of its own
statutes ? The question, in my opinion,
must be answered in the affirmative.
How can it be otherwise? The body
that possess a law must of necessity
promulgate it in some form. In point
of fact the legislative power over the
certification of its own laws is, of necessity, almost unlimited, as will appear
from the circumstance that with regard
to the body of an act there is no evidence
of any kind but that which the legislature
itself furnishes in the copy deposited in
the state archives. The journals do not
purport to contain more than the amendments, so that the legislative control is
absolute with regard to the essential parts
of most of the laws which are enacted.
We are also to reflect that it is the power
which passes the law which can best
determine what the law is which itself has
created.
The legislature in this case has
certified to this court, by the hands of its
two principal officers, that the act now
before us is the identical statute which
they approved, and in my opinion it is not
competent for this court to institute an
inquiry into the truth of the fact thus
solemnly attested."
State v. Young,
33 N. J. 192 ; s. c. 5 Amer. L. Reg.
679.
In Evans v. Browne, 30 Ind. 514, it
was said: "Can it be tolerated that a
court must be informed what the law is
by the verdict of a jury, as it would be in
criminal cases ? that in one case it shall
be compelled, by the finding of an issue,
to determine that the legislature has enacted thus and so, and in the very next
case to be tried, where the same issue is
not made by the pleadings, or the same
evidence has not been produced, or another jury has found differently, the very
same court must determine that there is
no such statute ? It is a maxim old as
the common law, and a rule of necessity,
that the court takes judicial notice of
VoL. XXXV.-39

public law; it is presumed to know what
it is, and it is its duty to know it. Even
the private citizen must know it at his
peril ; and his responsibilities and duties
are based upon the conclusive presumption that he has this knowledge. Must
the court employ the machinery of a trial
to give information to the judge, which,
as a citizen, he must, at the risk, possibly, of his liberty or life, have possessed
before lie was called to the bench ? It is
a most mischievous departure from plain
and wise maxims, derived from that system of laws which forms the basis of,
and constitutes largely the body of, ours;
and, while it would have disturbed the
harmony and order of judicial administration in England, it would in this
state, in view of the provisions of our
constitution, which contains specific
directions for the mode of authenticating
statutes by high legislative officers, acting under solemn oath, and requires a
journal of legislative proceedings to be
kept and published, be entirely destitute
of any conceivable utility. The enrolled
acts, with their authentication, are deposited in a public office, and are there
accessible to everybody. The journals
are public documents, at least, if not
records ; and are also within reach of all.
Whatever, affecting the question of a
quorum, such as the resignation of members, may have been lodged with the
governor, may also be inspected. In
short, every fact* upon which, in any
view, depends the question whether a
document purporting to be a statute has,
by legislative action, been invested with
the force of law, is, in its nature, a public fact which may be easily ascertained ;
it is a fact of public current history, and
there is therefore no necessity for bringing it to judicial knowledge by finding
of an issue. It may be true, that, ordinarily, the courts would not, unless the
matter was questioned, make any investigations beyond the statute-book itself;
but this argument is not forcible ; for the
industry and research of counsel can as
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well put the court upon inquiry by an
argument and a'reference to the sources
of information, as by pleading upon the
record. To us it seems an astonishing
fact in the history of jurisprudence, that
there should be, in this country especially, have ever existed a conflict of
decisions upon the subject, or that it
should have been seriously presented as
a question for judicial determination."
In the case last quoted from it is said
farther along in it : "The constitution
provides that a majority of all the members elected to each house shall be necessary to pass every bill, and that all bills
so passed shall be signed by the presiding officers of the respective houses."
The veto on the passage of a bill cannot
of course, be lawfully taken in the absence of a quorum. What, then, was
the purpose in requiring this attestation
by the presiding officers? Was it intended as an idle form ? It is not fair so
to assume. What possible object, then,
was sought to be accomplished by it, unless it was to furnish evidence that the
paper thus attested had been by the proper processes of each house clothed with
the force of law-evidence upon the enrolled act itself which should be taken as
authenticated and prove itself upon inspection ? The act, the validity of which
is here controverted, is thus attested by
sworn officers, in the form required by
the constitution. It is important, certainly, that the question, whether the
enactment of a statute is valid, shall be
made capable of ready and correct solution, and that the evidence thereof shall
be preserved, and that it shall not depend
upon doubtful or conflicting evidence.
When all are bound to know the law,
they should have the means of knowledge,
and not merely reasons for conjecture,
uncertainty and doubt. It has been conceded in the argument for the appellant,
that the attestation in this case is prima
fade sufficient to show a statute regularly and properly enanted, but contended that this only is the force of the

authentication required by the constitution. The houses must keep journals of
their proceedings, which, however, are
not, like the enrolment, required to be
either attested or preserved ; and it is
argued that there is an appeal to these,
from the official attestation of the presiding officers, and to the archives in the
executive department. Would the journals be as satisfactory to the mind ? Such
journals, it is notorious, are, and must
be, made in baste, in the confusion of
business, and are often inaccurate. Their
reading is frequently omitted from day
to day, so that those errors go without
correction. They do not show the nature
of the bill as introduced, but merely the
amendments which have been proposed
to it. They are not required to contain
anything by which it could be even identified and its passage traced. They are
not required to show whether or not a
quorum is present. Journals such as
these had been kept by the legislature of
the state from the beginning. The convention which framed the present constitution must be supposed to have had
knowledge of these things. Can the
opinion be entertained that they meant
that the journals, necessarily imperfect
and incomplete memorials, should, as
evidence, override the solemn attestation
of the passage of a bill, which they were
so careful to require, by the presiding
officers ? Or can it be supposed that
they meant that two records should be
looked to as concurrent proofs of the
same fact, and yet made no provision
for guidance when these should happen
to be in conflict ? By what reason or
analogy can we sustain ourselves in
holding that the journal should override
the signature upon the enrolled act ?
Surely not because it is, in the nature
of things, more likely to speak the whole
truth upon the question in hand. Surely
not because it is a rule that the truth of
any other record in the world, attested
as the law requires to make it proof, may
be successfully combatted by something
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else, not made by law superior to the
attestation of the proper officer. * * *
But it is argued, that if the authenticated
roll is conclusive upon the courts, then
less than a quorum of each house may,
by the aid of corrupt presiding officers,
impose laws upon the state in defiance of
the inhibition of the constitution. It
must be admitted that the consequence
stated would be possible. Public authority and political power must, of necessity, be confided to officers, who, being
human, may violate the trust reposed in
them. This perhaps cannot be avoided
absolutely. But it applies also to all
human agencies. It is not fit that the
judiciary should claim for itself a purity
beyond others ; nor has it been able at
all times with truth to say that its high
places have not been disgraced. The
framers of our government have not constituted it with faculties to supervise coordinate departments and correct or prevent abuses of their authority. It cannot
authenticate a statute; that power does
not belong to it; nor can it keep the legislative journal. It ascertains the statute law by looking at its authentication,
and then its function is merely to expound
and administer it. It cannot, we think,
look beyond that authentication, because
of the constitution itself. If it may, then
for the same reason it may go beyond the
journal, when that is impeached; and so
the validity of legislation may be made
to depend upon the memory of witnesses,
and no man can, in fact, know the law,
which he is bound to obey. Such consequences would be a large price to pay
for immunity from the public abuse of
authority by the high officers who are, as
we think, charged with the duty of certifying to the public the fact that a statute
has been enacted by competent power.
Human governments must repose confidence in officers. It may be abused, and
there may be no remedy.
Nor is there any great force in the
argument which seems to be regarded as
of weight by some American courts, that
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some important provisions of the constitution would be a dead letter if inquiry
may not be made by the courts beyond
the rolls. This argument overlooks the
fact that legislators are sworn to support
the constitution, or else it assumes that
they will wilfully violate that oath. It
is neither modest nor just for judges thus
to impeach the integrity of another
department of government, and to claim
that the judiciary only will be faithful to
its obligation."
It will be observed that the quotation
just made touches upon the weakness of
the evidence with which it is sought to
overthow the presumption raised by the
enrolled act. This is the second ground
upon which courts refuse to look to those
journals to see if it was constitutionally
passed. These journals are often kept
in a very careless manner. They are not
authenticated by the presiding officer of
either house, nor usually by any one.
Often they are not read to either house
for its approval, but the reading is dispenscd with. They" do not always contain amendments not objected to, and
which the clerk deems of little importance,
and that in the ordinary course they are
frequently not even submitted for approval to the body whose acts they purport to record. Evidence which would
seem less reliable it is hardly possible to
present to the legal mind; it has not one
of the guarantees, which, even in the
most ordinary transactions, are required
to raise a presumption in favor of testimony. Can any one deny that if the
laws of the state are to be tested by a
comparison with these journals-so imperfect-soauthenticated-that the stability of all written laws will be shaken to
its very foundation 7 Certainly no person can venture to say that many of
our statutes, perhaps some of the oldest
and most important, those which affect
large classes of persons, or on which great
interests depend, will not be found defective, even in constitutional particulars,
if judged by this criterion. The mis-
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placing of a name on a nicely-balanced
ot might obvibusly invalidate any act;
what assurance is there, therefore, that a
critical examination of those loosely-kept
registers will reveal many fatal errors of
this description ? In addition to these
considerations, in judging of consequences, we are to remember the danger,
under the prevalence of such a doctrine,
to be apprehended from the intentional
corruption of evidence of this character.
It it surely too much to say that the legal
existence of almost every legislative act
would be at the mercy of all persons
having access to those journals, for it is
obvious any law can be invalidated by the
interpretation of a few lines, or the obliteration of one name and the substitution of another in its stead. I cannot
consent to expose the state legislation to
the hazards of such probable. error or
facile fraud. The doctrine contended for
on the part of the defence has no foundation, in my estimation, in any considerations of public policy." State v. Young,
supra.
A number of cases support these questions, in principle, and that the courts
cannot look beyond the enrolled act when
authenticated according to law and filed
in the proper office. Pacific Rd. v. The
Governor, 23 Mo. 353; s. c. 66 Am.
Dec. 673; Clare v. State, 5 Iowa 509 ;
Dun-ombe v. Prindle, 12 Id. 2 ; Green v.
Weller, 32 Miss. 651 ; Fouke v. EFeming,
13 Md. 392 ; People v. Devlin, 33 N. Y.
269; Pangborn v. Young, 33 N. J. L.
29; Fan Dorn v. Bodley, 38 Ind. 402,
422; Bender v.State, 53 Id. 254 ; Turbeville v. State, 42 Id. 490; Edger v.
Board, 4-c., 70 Id. 331 ; Board, f-c., v.
Burford, 93 Id. 383; Mayor v. Harwood, 32 Md. 471 ; s. c. 3 Am. Rep.
161 ; Louisiana State Lottery v. Richoux,
23La. Ann. 743; s.c.8 Am. Rep. 602;
Speer v. Plank Road Co., 22 -Penn. St.
376 ; Eld v. Gorham, 20 Conn. 8 ; Serman v.Story, 30 Cal. 253 ; Swann v.
Buck, 40 Miss. 268; Warner v. Beers,
23 Wend. 125. See Bound v. Wisconsin

Central Rd., 45 Wis. 543 ; Sate v.Swft,
10 Nev. 176 ; s. c. 21 Am. Rep. 721 ;
State v. Ryan, 10 Ne. 250; Brodnax
v. Groom, 64 N. C. 244.
The rule of these decisions has been
applied even to an amendment to a state
constitution. Green v. Welter, 32 Miss.
651; but in Indiana it would seem that
it is not applicable in such a case. State
v. Swift, 69 Ind. 505 ; State v. MicBride,
4 Mo. 303; Kochler v. Hill, 60 Iowa
543.
Nor is evidence admissible to prove a
mistake of an engrossing clerlk. Mayor
v. Rarwood, 32 Md. 471; s. c. 3 Am.
Rep. 161.
It cannot be shown that even a private
act was not passed. Brodnax v. Groom,
64 N. C. 244.
On the other band there are many
decisions which hold that the question of
the passage of an act by the legislature
may be raised by the pleadings, and the
courts will then examine the journals, at
least, to see if the act drawn in question
legally passed.
" The principal argument in favor of
this judicial appeal from the enrolled law
to the legislative journal, and which was
much pressed in the discussion at the bar,
was that the existence of this power was
necessary to keep the legislature from
overstepping the bounds of the constitution. The course of reasoning urged
was, that it the court cannot look at the
facts and examine the legislative action,
that department of government can at
will set at defiance, in the enactment of
statutes, the restraints of the organic
law." State v. Young, supra.
In another case it was said: "The
journals of each house were evidently
intended to furnish the public and the
courts with the means of ascertaining
what was actually done in each branch
of the legislature. They are to be treated
as authentic records of the proceedings,
and the court may resort to them when
the validity of an act is questioned upon
the ground of failure of the legislature
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to observe a matter of substance in its
passage, for the purpose of ascertaining
whether the constitutional provisions have
been substantially complied with or not.
The certificate of the presiding officers is
merely prima facie evidence that an act
has been duly passed, and will be overthrown if it appears from the journals
State v. M;Lelland,
that it was not."
18 Neb. 236; s. c. 53 Amer. Rep. 814.
The case last cited refers to Gardner
v. Collector, 6 Wall. 499. That was a
case where the President approved an act
without affixing the year of its approval.
It was held competent to show this by
parol. It was there said : "We are of
opinion therefore on principle, as well as
on authority, that whenever a question
arises in a court of law of the existence
of a statute or of the time when a statute
took effect, or of the precise terms of a
statute, the judges who are called upon
to decide it have a right to resort to any
source of information which in its nature
is capable of conveying to the judicial
mind a clear and satisfactory answer to
such question, always seeking first for
that which in its nature is most appropriate, unless the positive law has enacted
But it seems to us
a different rule."
that this case is not in point; clearly it is
not; nor does it lend support to the question whether the enrolled act is conclusive
evidence of its passage.
In a Maryland case it was said:
"While the presumption arising from the
proper forms of authentication of a statute
is very strong, that the statute was regularly and constitutionally enated by the
legislature, the authorities maintain that
such presumption may be overcome by
competent evidence, and the statute may
be shown to have nevdr been constitutionally enacted. And this court has so
decided at the present term in the case of
Berry v. Baltimore 4- Drum Point Rd.,
41 Md 446 ; s. c. 20 Am. Rep. 69.
A valid statute can only be passed in the
manner prescribed by the constitution,
and where the provisions of that instru-

ment in regard to the manner of enactiig
laws are wholly disregarded in respect to
a particular act, it would seem to be a
necessary conclusion that the act, though
having the forms of authenticity, must be
declared to be a nullity, otherwise the
express mandatory provisions of the constitution would be of no avail or force
whatever." Legg v. Mayor, &-c., 42
Md. 220.
Supporting the principle of these last
citations there are many cases ; even so
does a standard text book, Cooley on
Const. Lim. p. 135 ; Osburn v. Staley,
5 W. Va. 85; s. c. 13 Am. Rep. 640;
People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481;
1panglerv.Jacoby, 14 Ill. 297 ; Turley
T. Logan, Co., 17 Id. 151 ; Prescott v.
Canal Trustees, 19 Id. 324; Supervisors
of Schuyler Co. v. People, 25 Id. 181 ;
People v. Starne, 35 Id. 121 ; Ryan v.
Lynch, 68 Id. 160; Miller v. Goodwin,
s. c. 7 Chicago Leg. News 294; Ottawa
v. Perkins (following the Illinois decisions because passing upon an Illinois
statute), 94 U. S. 260 ; Town of Walnut
v. Wade (for the same reason), 103 U. S.
683; Larrison v. Rd., 77 111. 11 ; Town
of Ohio v. Frank (for the same reason),
103 U. S. 697 ; State v. Platt, 2 S. C.
150; s.c. 16 Amer. Rep. 647 ; Opinion
of the Judges, 35 N. H. 579; Purdy v.
People, 2 Hill 33; s. c. 4 Id. 384;
De Bowv. People, I Denio I1 : Sonthwick
Bank v. Com., 26 Penn. St. 446 ; Fowler v. Pierce, 2 Cal. 165; Opinionof the
Judges, 52 N. H. 622; Skinner v.
Deming, 2 Ind. 558 : Coleman v. Dobbins,
8 Id. 156 ; Moodyv. State, 48 Ala. 115;
s. c. 17 Am. Rep. 28 ; State v. McLelland, 18 Neb. 236; s. c. 53 Am. Rep.
253 ;
814; People v. De Wolf, 62 Ill.
Statev. Hastings, 24 Minn. 78; Opin.of
Justices, 45 N. H. 607 ; Jones v. Hutchinson, 43 Ala. 721 ; People v. Conummel,
54 N. Y. 276; State v. Franci.%,26 Kan.
724; -Exparte Vanderbmg, 28 Id. 243;
Com. v. Jackson, 5 Bush 680; Brown v.
Nash, I Wy. Tr. 85 ; Walker v. State,
12 S. C. 200; Smithee v. Garth, 33 Ark.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. RICE.
17 ; Worthen v. Badqett, 32 Id. 496 ;
Ryan v. Lynch,'48 IIl. 160; English v.
Oliver, 28 Ark. 317; Division of Howard
County, 15 Kan. 194 ; Brady v. West,
50 Miss. 68; People v. Lowenthal, 93
I. 191 ; Perry v. Selma, 58 Ala. 546 :
People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 53; Dew v.
Cunningham, 28 Ala. 466; Corning v.
Greene, 23 Barb. 33; People v. Petrea,
92 N. Y. 128, following the early decisions; State v. Gould, 31 Minn. 189;
Fordgce v. Godman, 20 Ohio St- 1.
To test the question an issue must be
raised touching the passage by the pleadings : People v. Chenango, 8 N. Y. 317;
79 ; Grob v. CushRd. v. Wren, 43 Ill.
man, 45 fll. 124.
And all the cases agree that the courts
"cannot inquire into the motive by which
the law was produced :" Fletcherv. Peck,
6 Cranch 131 ; People v. Devlin, 33 N.
Y. 268. As that the act was passed by
means of bribery: Lusher v. S&cites, 4
W. Va. 11 ; Wright v. Defrees, 8 Ind.
298 ; State v. Fagan, 22 La. Ann. 545;
Jersey City, 4c., Rd. v. JerseyCity, 4-c.,
Rd., 20 N. J. Eq. 61 ; Lynn v. Polk, 8
Lea 121 ; People v. Petrea, 92 N. Y.
128 ; McCullough v. State, 11 Ind. 424 ;
Sunbury, 6-c., Rd. v. Cooper, 7 Am. L.
Reg. (0. S.) 158. Nor can either party
to a suit admit that an act is invalid, and
thereby bind the courts in its determination ; Happel v. Brethauer, 70 Ill.166;
s. o. 22 Am. Rep. 70.
Whether or not an act passed a state
legislature, the federal courts will follow
the decisions of the courts of that state :
Amoskeag Nat. Bank v. Town of Ottawa,
105 U. S. 667.
Whether or not a law passed is always
a question for the court and not for a jury:
Amoskeag Nat. Bank v. Ottawa, supra.
All the cases admit that the enrolled
act is primafacie evidence of the legality
of the passage of the bill, in faet that it
is very strong evidence of it ; and they
nearly all admit that courts will take
judicial knowledge of the journals of
the two houses.

In no case, it is believed, has evidence
beyond the journal entries been admitted.
Those entries cannot be contradicted.
They are conclusive proofs of the facts
recited: 52 N. H. 622 ; McCulloch v.
State, 11 Ind. 424 ; State v. Moffitt, 5
Ohio 358; Ryan v. Lynch, 68 Ill. 160 ;

Happel v. Brethauer, 70 Ill. 166. The
manuscript journals will prevail over the
printed copy if there be a difference between them : County of Santa Clara Y.
Southern Pac. Ry., 18 Fed. Rep. 285 ;
Chicot County v. Davies, 40 Ark. 200.
If corrected during a special session of
the legislature that caused it to be made,
the corrections will be followed: Turley
v. County of Logan, 17 Ill. 151.
It has been held that a failure of the
journal to show a compliance of the
constitutional provisions will not render
the act void : State v. Mead, 71 Mo.
266 ; Williams v. State, 6 Lea 549 ; Bx
parte Vanderherg, 28 Kan. 243 ; Chicot
County v. Davies, 40 Ark. 200 ; Worthen
v. Badgett, 33 Id. 496 ; Walker v.
Griffith, 60 Ala. 361 ; Harrisonv.Gordy,
57 Ala. 49 ; unless the constitution requires it, it has been held in some cases,
the facts touching the passage of an act
to be set forth: Spangler v. Jacoby, 14
Ill.297.

It has been held that unless the journals show affirmatively that an act did
not pass, it will be conclusively presumed that the enrolled act is a law : Ex
parte Vanderberg, 28 Ken. 243; see
Walker v. Grfflth, 60 Ala. 361.
It will be seen by the authorities that
the greater number of courts will examine the journals to see if an act has
passed with the requisite vote. But it is
believed that these cases do not rest upon
a solid basis. The doctrine probably had
its origin in Purdy v. People, 4 Hill

384, "a case," of which it has been
said, "from the report of which it is
almost impossible to tell what was held
by the majority to be law upon any subject, but in which the actual judgment
of reversal in favor of the plaintiff in
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error (who disputed the validity of the
passage of an act, and yet did not raise
the question by pleading) precludes the
possibility of such a ruling.' "Finally,
in The Peopte v. The Supervisors, &,c.,
4
Sold. 317, without giving any reason or
citing any authority to sustain it [the
court], did distinctly lay down the doctrine, in a ease where it was certainly
entirely unnecessary to have considered
the question at all :" Evans v. .Browne,
30 Ind. 514.
Why the solemn attestation of three
officers-the chosen officers of the two
houses, and the governor, who all report
to the general assembly in open session
that they have signed a certain bill, and
that it is a law, thereby giving the assembly the opportunity to enter a protest
against the bill becoming a law, or to repeal it--should be overcome by a mere
journal entry of a negligent clerk, it is

difficult to see. To say that the provisions of a constitution require the journal
to show the yeas and nays, or that a certain thing was done with respect to the
passage of a bill,-that these must appear affirmatively on that journal to
render a bill valid is to put something
into the constitution that is not there ;
and to cast an imputation of dishonesty
or carelessness upon two other great and
co-equal departments of the government
is unworthy of the judiciary. It is simply another illustration of that grasping
greed of power in the courts everywhere
so dangerously and alarmingly visible,
and which cannot be too soon guarded
against. To our minds the reasoning in
Evans v. Browne, and State v. Young, is
conclusive.
W. W. THORNTON.

Crawfordsville, Ind.

Court of Appeas of Kentucky.
McCRACKEN COUNTY v. MERCANTILE TRUST CO.,

ET. AL.

Where a cause of action is barred by the Statute of Limitations in force at the
time the right to sue arose, and until the time of limitation expired, the right to rely
upon the statute as a defence is a vested right that cannot be divested by a subsequent act of the legislature extending the period of limitation.

APPEAL from McCracken Common Pleas Court.

L. D.

Tsbands, for appellant, McCracken County.

W. Cr. Bullitt, for appellees, Mercantile Trust Co., and another.
HOLT, J.-The appellee, Marcella Laurie, was the owner, in 1873
and 1874, of a lot of land in McCracken county, which was assessed
for taxation for those years for county purposes. The taxes remain-

ing unpaid, the county collector, on December 17th 1874, sold the
property to satisfy the amount owing for 1873; and on March 8th
1875, he again sold it for the taxes of 1874; the county in each
instance becoming the purchaser at the price of the taxes due upon
it. Subsequently the Mercantile Trust Company purchased the
property. On the 18th of February 1884, the legislature passed
an act, the first section of which provides "that in all cases where
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real estate in McCracken county has been heretofore sold by any
collecting officer, or by other proceedings on behalf of said county
for taxes due McCracken county, and bought by said county, it shall
be lawful for said county in its name to file a petition in equity in
the McCracken Court of Common Pleas, or other court of said
county that may have civil equitable jurisdiction, against the owner,
his heirs, or assigns, or devisees (as the case may be), of such real
estate so sold, as aforesaid, and bought by said county, describing
the same with reasonable certainty, and also make defendant to the
suit the owner, by purchase, if any, of such real estate, and all
mortgagees or other incumbrancers, if any, of said land at the time
suit was brought; and it shall be lawful for the county, the plaintiff
in the suit, to subject such real estate in rem, by the judgment of
the court, and have a sale of such land under the same, for the satisfaction of the amount of the price at which the county may have
bid off such real estate at the collecting officer's sale of the same,
or under other proceedings, with interest thereon at six per cent.
per annum from the date of such sale until paid, and all costs of the
action, including an attorney's fee of five dollars, which shall be
taxed as costs in favor of the plaintiff in the action in every case
of recovery. And the county of McCracken is hereby declared to
have a continuing and subsisting lien upon the real estate for the
satisfaction of the amount of such taxes, interest and costs aforesaid; and, in the enforcement of the same, as aforesaid, no plea of
the Statute of Limitations shall be interposed thereto other than
the statute of fifteen years."
This action was brought by the county on August 5th 1884, to
enforce its alleged lien for the sums at which it had bid in the property at the collector's sales, and to sell the same therefor. More
than five years had elapsed from the time the taxes were due, and
also from the date of the collector's sales, before the purchase by
the trust company ; also before the passage of the act uTpra, and
before the bringing of this action.
The general law in force during that time provides: "An action
upon a liability created by statute, when no other time is fixed by
the statute creating the liability, * * * shall be commenced within
five years next after the cause of action accrued." Gen. St., c.71,
art. 3, sect. 2.
The-defence of five years' limitation was interposed. The county
demurred to it, relying upon the provision in the act of February
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18th 1884 ; "and in the enforcement of the same, as aforesaid, no
plea of the Statute of Limitations shall be interposed thereto other
than the statute of fifteen years ;" and its validity is now in question; the demurrer having been overruled.
It is clear that, at the time of its passage, the collection of the
claim could not have been enforced. The defence to it was perfect.
Had the legislature the power to divest this right ? The question
is res nova in this state. Beyond doubt it may, before a claim is
barred under the existing law, extend the time for its enforcement.
Upon the other hand, it may shorten it, provided it affords a reasonable time for its assertion. It is urged, however, that time does
not pay a debt; that the Statute of Limitations does not extinguish
it, but merely relates to and withholds the remedy; and that, as it
is founded upon public policy, it is a matter bounded only by legislative discretion.
It is agreed upon all hands that in cases where, by the lapse of
time, a title to property is vested, that it cannot be divested by the
legislature. This is not disputed by any authority known to us;
but some of them have attempted to draw a distinction between such
a case and the enforcement of a mere debt or obligation. Upon
the other hand, it has been denied that there is any foundation
whatever for a difference. It is true that in the one case the party
in possession has been asserting a claim to the property; but in the
case of a mere debt the effect of its enforcement, when barred by
time, would be to divest the owner of his property ; and it seems
to us that there is little difference in fact, and none in principle,
whether the case relate to a claim to property in specie, or damages
for the breach of a contract or the enforcement of a debt merely.
A retrospective law which divests a vested right is beyond the constitutional limit of legislative power. If the legal right be gone,
the contract is discharged until it is in some legal way reaffirmed;
and when the constitutional test is applied by the courts, as is their
duty, it must be held that the legislature cannot make a new contract for the parties.
Some confusion has arisen by the failure of writers and jurists,
in speaking of the obligation of a contract, to distinguish between
the legal right and the moral one. Blackstone says: "that whereever there is a legal right there is a legal remedy," and "that the
want of right and the want of remedy are the same thing." Undoubtedly, the legal remedy may be modified or changed without
VOL. XXXV.-40
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impairing the legal right, if the remedy in the new form be not impaired ; but it seems to us that it is illogical to hold that the remedy
may be destroyed, and the legal right remain. A legal right is
one which is protected by law, and the means of protection is the
remedy ; and it is not to be supposed that one can have his legal
right seized by another, and yet be remediless. The existence of
one implies the existence of the other, and one cannot exist without
the other. It must be kept in mind that we are now speaking of
the legal right, and not the moral obligation. Both may exist; the
one being based upon civil and the other upon natural law. The
latter is not, therefore, affected by a statute of limitation which bars
the remedy and destroys the legal right.
We are aware that it was held in the earlier cases of Graves v.
Graves, 2 Bibb 207, and Ohiles v. Calk, 4 Id. 554, that such a
statute bars the remedy, and not the right; but the later cases hold
that it takes away the legal right; and they conform to sound reason, which says that when the law no longer protects a right, or
affords the means of enforcement, it necessarily dies: Stanley v.
Earl, 5 Litt. 281.
In Carr'sEx'r v. Robinson, 8 Bush 269, it is said: "If a promise was made after the running of the statute, this promise created
a new obligation, and constituted a new cause of action, upon which
suit should have been instituted. * * * After the lapse of fifteen
years from the maturity of the note without suit the obligation or
note is regarded as dead, and it cannot be revived by any promise
to pay so as to authorize a suit on the original debt or obligation;
but, if the promise is made during the fifteen years from the maturity of the note or obligation, it lengthens the vitality of the
paper, and the statute commences to run from the date of the promise." To the same effect is the case of .Trousdale'sAdm'r v.
Anderson, 9 Bush 277.
In Shelby County v. Scearce, 2 Duv. 576, this language was used:
"The legal obligation of a contract is neither more nor less than
a right to employ legal remedy to enforce or uphold the rights and
duties of the parties to the contract. Wherever there is a legal
remedy, there is a legal obligation; and wherever there is no legal
remedy, there is no legal obligation."
We con'clude, therefore, that both upon sound reasoning and former opinions of this court, that the statute of limitations of this
state not only bars the remedy, but takes away the legal right.
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It is therefore unnecessary to discuss the question whether the
legislature would have the power, if our statute of limitations
merely barred the remedy, leaving the legal right in existence, to
take from a person what has become a perfect defence to a claim or
debt, or to notice the cases upon the one side which hold that it has
the right to do so in such a case, or those upon the other adopting
the contrary view.
. Wood, Lim., sect. 12, says: "If, before the statute bar
has become complete, the statutory period is changed, and no mention is
made of existing claims, it is generally held that the old law is not
modified by the new, so as to give to both statutes a proportional
effect; but that the time passed is effaced, and the new law governs;
that is, the period provided by the new law must run upon all existing claims in order to constitute a bar. In other words, the statute
in force at the time the action is brought controls, unless the time
limited by the old statute for commencing an action has elapsed,
while the old statute was in force, and before the suit is brought, in
which case the suit is barred, and no subsequent statute can renew
the right or take away the bar."
In Cooley, Const. Lim. 455, it is said: "1Regarding the circumstances under which a man may be said to have a vested right to a
defence against a demand made by another, it is somewhat difficult
to lay down a comprehensive rule which the authorities will justify.
It is certain that he who has satisfied a demand cannot have it
revived against him, and he who has become released from a demand by the operation of the statute of limitations is equally protected. In both cases the demand is gone, and to restore it would
be to create a new contract for the parties-a thing quite beyond
the power of legislation."
The legal demand is discharged, leaving nothing but a moral
obligation, binding only in foro conscientie; and hence a revival
of it by legislative enactment involves, not only the creation of a
new obligation, but the violation of a vested right. Puffendorf
says: "A law can, be repealed by the lawgiver, but the rights
which have been acquired under it while it was in force do not
thereby cease." This was the rule of the civil law, and has been
strictly adhered to in England, where there is no express restriction
upon the legislative power.
In the states of Massachusetts, Michigan, Arkansas, Mississippi,
Pennsylvania, Iowa, Indiana, Tennessee, New Hampshire, Wiscon-
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sin, Alabama, and perhaps others, it has been held that the legislature cannot extend the time, if the cause of action be already
barred. It is true that in some of these states the rule is based
upon a clause in the state constitution forbidding retrospective
legislation; in others the statute of limitations is held to extinguish
the obligation ; while in others the rule rests upon the broad ground
that the defence having become perfect, it is a vested right, which
cannot be taken away by legislative action.
In the case of Girdner v. Stevens, 1 Heisk. 280, it was said:
"We hold, both on authority and principle, where a cause of action
is barred by a statute of limitations in force at the time the right to
sue arose, and until the time of limitation expired, that the right to
rely upon the statute as a defence is a vested right, that cannot be
disturbed by subsequent legislation." In the cases of Bight v.
Martin, 11 Ind. 123; Baldro v. Tolmie, I Or. 176; and Brown
v. Parker, 28 Wis. 21-it was held that a repealing act cannot
renew a liability that has already been extinguished; and in
ilf'Kinney v. Springer,8 Blackf. 506, and Bockport v. Walden, 54
N. H. 167, that no subsequent statute can renew a "right to sue
which is already barred.
Beyond question the legislature cannot take the property of one
citizen and give it to another. Neither can it do so indirectly, by
depriving one of the right to set up a defence perfect in him at the
time. It is a part of our fundamental law that no one can be deprived
of his property without due process at law. This not only requires
that a party shall be brought into court, but that he shall have the
opportunity, when there, to assert any defence to which he has become entitled, and which will protect his property. We conclude
that to hold the clause in question of the statute valid as to a claim
without legal existence at the time of its passage would not only
divest a party of a defence at the time perfect, but would make a
new contract for the parties, and thus pass the constitutional limit
of legislative action.
By the sixth section of an act of the legislature approved February 12, 1872 (Acts 1871-72, p. 339), it was declared that the
county should have a perpetual lien on the property assessed for
the tax until payment; and it is claimed, therefore, that there is
no limitation as to its collection. The fourth section of the act
gave the county the right, in case it had purchased the property for
the taxes, to enforce a lien against it therefore by a suit in equity,

McCRACKEN CO. v. MERCANTILE TRUST CO.

817

and sell the interest of the taxpayer therein. This lien was created
when the assessment was made, and was but an incident of the tax,
claim or obligation. There is no statute of limitation as to liens.
If the claim becomes barred, the lien dies with it: Tate v. Hawkins,
81 Ky 577. If the claim could be made an incident of the lien,
then "the statute of repose" would be defeated. As the claim no
longer legally existed, the lien had nothing to support its existence.
Judgment affirmed.
As applied to cases where the time
limited has not lapsed, statutes of limitations relate to the remedy, and not to the
right ; and it is competent for the legislature to extend the time or repeal the
statute, or still further limit the time,
provided that no statute can have the effect of barring a cause of action already
existing without giving a reasonable time
in which to prosecute the same: Carr's
Ex'rs v. Robinson, 8 Bush 269 ; Bigelow v. Bemis, 2 Allen 496 ; .Rockport v.
Walden's Ex'rs, 54 N. H. 167 : Piatt
v. Vattier, 1 McLean 146; Bender v.
Crawford, 33 Tex. 745 ; Dwight v. Overton, 35 Id. 390 ; Lewis v. Davidson, 51
Id. 251.
It is clear upon authority, that the
lapse of time limited by statutes, for the
bringing of an action, not only bars
the remedy, but extinguishes the right to
real property and specific personal property, and that the power of the legislature does not extend to the removing of
such bar and the divesting of rights thus
vested: Wynn v. Lee, 5 Ga. 217 ; Newcombe v. Leavitt, 22 Ala. 631 ; Chiles v.
J'ones, 4 Dana 479 ; larback v. M1iller,
4 Neb. 31; Graflus v. Tottenham, 1 W.
& S. 488; Schall v. W. V. Rd., 35
Penn. St. 204; Thompson v. Caldwell,
3 Litt. (Ky.) 136; Garth's Ex'rs v.
Barksdale,5 Aunf. (Va.) 101 ; Newby's
Adm's v. Blakey, 3 Hen. & Munf. (Va.)
57 ; Sprecker v. Wakeley, II Wis. 432 ;
Hill v. Kricke, Id. 442 ; Knox v. Cleveland, 13 Id. 245 ; Brent v. Chapman, 5
Cranch 358 ; Shelby v. Guy, 11 Wheat.
361; Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black

(U. S.) 599; Campbell v. Holt, 6 Sup.

Ct. Rep. 209; Stocker v. Berry, 1 Ld.
Raym. 741 ; Atkyns v. Horde, I Burr.
119 ; Stokes v. Berry, 2 Salk. 421 ;
Barwick v. Thompson, 7 Tcrm.Rep. 488.
It is a good defence to an action for
property in a
the recovery of specific
jurisdiction where the time limited for
bringing the action has not lapsed, that
the right to the property has vested under
the laws of another state : Newcombe v.
Leavitt, 22 Ala. 631 : Wynn Y. Lea, 5
Ga. 217 ; Shelbyv. Guy, 11 Wheat. 361.
It is also well settled, that where a state
constitution forbids "retrospective" law
it is not competent for the legislature to
remove the bar of the Statute of Limitations, either to the recovery of specific
property, or of a debt or damages: Davis
v. Minor, I How. (Miss.) 183; Woart
v. Winnick, 3 N. H. 473.
In other cases, courts have held that
the repeal of the statute did not revive a
cause of action for debt or damages already barred; but they have so held,
generally, on the ground that such was
not the intention of the legislature, rather
than for the reason, that the legislature
did not possess the power to remove the
bar : Robb v. Harlan, 7 Penn. St. 292
Kinsman v. Cambridge, 121 Mass. 558:
Ball v. Wyeth, 99 Id. 338; Prenticev.
Dehon, 10 Allen 353; .Bradford v.
Shine, 13 Fla. 393 ; Couch v. McKee, 1
Eng. (Ark.) 493; Moore v. McLendon,
5 Id. 512 ; Lowry v. Keyes, 14 Vt. 66;
Wires v. Farr, 25 Id. 41.
On the power of a legislature, where
the state constitution does not forbid re-
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statute against bringing an action other
than for the recovery of specific property,
the authorities do not warrant the unqualified negative that the text writers
assume. The Supreme Court of the
United States declared, in a recent case,
that the legislature possessed such power;
"It may, therefore, very well be held,
that in an action to recover real or
personal property, where the question
is as to the removal of the bar of
the Statute of Limitations, by a legislative act, passed after the bar has
become perfect, that such act deprives
the party of his property, without due
process of law. The reason is, that
by the law in existence before the repealing act, the property has become the defendant's. Both the legal title and the
real ownership had become invested in
him, and to give the act the effect of
transferring this title to plaintiff would
be to deprive him of his property without due process of law. But we are of
opinion that, to remove the bar which
the Statute of Limitations enables a
debtor to interpose, to prevent the payment of his debt, stands on very different
grounds. * -*

"That the proposition is sound, that in
regard to debt or assumpsit on contract
the remedy alone is gone and not the
obligation, is obvious from a class of
cases which have never been disputed.
(1) It is uniformly conceded that the
debt is a sufficient consideration for a
new promise to pay made after the bar
has become perfect. (2) It has been
held in all the English courts that though
the right of action may be barred in the
country where the defendant resides or
has resided and where the contract was
made, so that the bar in that jurisdiction
is complete, it is no defence if he can be
found to a suit in another country. * * *
"The right does not enter into or become part of the contract. No man
promises to pay money with any view to
being released from that obligation by

lapse of time. It violates no right of his,
therefore, when the legislature says time
shall be no bar, though such was the law
when the contract was made :" Campbell
v.Holt, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 209.
In Jones v. Jones, 18 Ala. 248, the
court said: " But it is contended that
there is no difference between the effect
of the statute when applied to property
held adversely, and when applied to
contracts for the payment of money. It
is, however, sufficient to observe, that
when property, whetherreal or personal,
is held adversely, the statute operates on
the title, and when the bar is complete
the title of the original owner is defeated
and the adverse possessor has the complete title. * * * But in the case of a
contract there is no such thing as adverse
possession ; the remedy alone is affected
by the statute and not the debt itself."
And again in Swmckard v. Bailey, 3
Kan. 507, itwas said: "When the law
that deprived his remedy thereon is repealed, the obligation of the contract is
not thereby revived ; that never was extinguished. But the inability to maintain a suit to enforce it is removed. The
situation of the parties is as if the law
had never existed, unless there be saving
clauses. * * *
"Many persons are misled by failing to
observe the distinction between the effects
of acts creating prescriptions and acts of
limitation merely. The former operate
under certain circumstances to vest the
title to property in the possessor to the
same extent and efflect that a purchase
and conveyance would do ; and a repeal
thereof would, if effectual, divest him
thereof, thereby directly interfering with
vested rights. The latter operate solely
upon the remedy hnd may be changed,
modified or repealed without affecting
vested rights. It would be somewhat
paradoxical to say, that a man has a
vested right to avoid the payment of a
just and legal debt."
This distinction seems to be recognised

in other cases: Wright V. Oakley, 5
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Met. 400; Smart v. Baugh, 3 J. J.
Marsh. 364.
On the other hand, the doctrine of the
principal case is supported by the authority of text writers, and by the weight
ofprecedent. In Girdner v. Stephens,
1 Heisk. (Tenn.) 280, cited in the principal case, it was said, that "there can
be no difference in principle whether it
is a right to recover land or personal
property in specie or damages for the
breach of a contract or for a tort."
And, in speaking of a law declared
unconstitutional .because "retrospectis a
ive," another court said: "It
maxim that there is no right without a
corresponding remedy; by which I understand that they are dependent terms ;
that one cannot exist without the other;
that the idea of a right is predicated on
and necessarily carries with it as essential to its existence the means also of
enforcing it; and the moment the remedy
is destroyed, the right must go with it:"
Davis v. Minor, I How. (bliss.) 183.
Of the many authorities cited in approval of the doctrine of the principal case,
a number were either decided without
argument or are so imperfectly reported
as to carry little weight: Martin v.
Martin, 35 Ala. 560; Goodman v.
Munksl, 8 Port. (Ala.) 84: Forsyth v.

Ripley, 2 Greene (Ia.) 181; Stipp v.
Brown, 2 Ind. 647 ; Right v. Martin, 11
Id. 123; M'Kinney v. Springer, 8
Blaekf. (Ind.) 506; Atkinson v. Dunlap, 50 Me. II1 ; Woodman v. Fulton,
47 Miss. 682 ; Ryder v. lVilson's Ex'rs,
41 N. J. L. 9; Burch v. Newbury, 6
Seld. 374; Baker v. Stonebraker's
Adm'rs, 36 Mlo. 339 ; M'Merty v. aorrisen, 62 Id. 140; Harrison v. Stacy,
6 'Rob. (La.) 15 ; Baldro v. ToInde, 1
Or. 176; Trim v. A1'Pherson, 7 Cald
(Tenn.) 15 ; Yancy v. Yancy, 5 Heisk.
(Tenn.) 353; Brown v. Parker, 28
Wis. 21. See also Wood Lim., sect 12 ;
Aug. Lim. sect. 23, n. 3; Cooley Const.
Lim. 365.
Where the time limited for enforcing
a claim in a certain form of action has
lapsed, and the bar against such an action is complete, but there yet remains
another form of action by which the
claim may be enforced, it is within the
power of the legislature to remove
the bar against the form of action so
barred.
Such action would probably
not be considered in any state as interfering with vested rights: Kipp v.
,Johnson, 31 linn. 360 ; s. c. 27 N. W.
Rep. 957.
CH.s. A. Ronmins.
Lincoln, NIcb.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
HowK, 0. J.-On the 19th day of November, 1885, the appellant's relator, Abram P. Andrew, filed his verified complaint or
affidavit herein, in the court below, wherein he stated that he was a
native-born citizen of the United States, and of this state, and was
then, and for more than ten years last past had been, i bona fide
resident householder, freeholder and tax-payer of the city of La
Porte, Indiana, and that he then resided, and for more than five
years last past had resided, in the Third ward of such city; that
the appellees, Leroy D. Webber, Edward J. Church and Ellis
Michael were the acting board of school trustees of such city, and,
as such trustees, were in charge of the public schools of such city;
and that the appellee, William N. Hailman, was employed by such
board as the superintendent of such public schools, and as such
superintendent had, under the direction of such board of trustees,
the general management, oversight, and supervision of such public
schools.
The relator further said that he was the father and natural guardian of one Abram Andrew, who was a white male child, between
the ages of six and twenty-one years, to wit, of the age of twelve
years, was unmarried, resided with the relator in the Third ward
of such city, and had so resided with and been subject to the control of his father the relator ever since his birth; that said Abram
Andrew was, in all respects, legally qualified and entitled to attend
the public schools of such city as a pupil thereof, and to receive
instruction therein; and that, for three years next preceding the
grievances thereinafter stated, said Abram Andrew had, in pursuance of his rights, and of the relator's rights and wishes, attended
such public schools as a pupil therein, during all which time he
had been an obedient and diligent pupil, and had faithfully complied
with all the rules and regulations prescribed by such board of school
trustees and superintendent for the government of such schools.
And the relator further said, that the public schools of such city
were what were known as "graded schools," one grade thereof being
known as the" high school :" that at the beginning of the school terra
of such schools, in the fall of 1885, the said Abram Andrew being
sufficiently advanced in his studies, in accordance with the relator's
desire and consent, and in compliance with his legal rights in the
premises, was admitted as a pupil in such high school, to receive
instruction therein, and thereafter, until his suspension, as herein-
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after stated, was regular in his attendance and deportment, and was
obedient and respectful to his teachers, and properly subordinate to
the rules and regulations of such school ; that among the exercises
prescribed by such superintendent, with the sanction of such board
of trustees, for the pupils of the high school, was a requirement that
each of the pupils should, at stated intervals, employ a certain period
of time in the study and practice of music, and that they should
provide themselves with prescribed books for that purpose; that the
relator, believing that it was not for the best interest of said Abram
Andrew, and not in accordance with the relator's wishes regarding
the instruction of his said son, in a respectful manner asked of such
superintendent, that Abram Andrew might be excused from the
study and practice of music, at such exercises, and directed Abram
Andrew not to participate therein, all in good faith, and in a respectful manner, and with no intention of in any manner interfering with the government, rules and regulations of such schools,
except in so far as he might legally control and direct the education
of his said son, which purpose and desire were fully communicated
by him to such superintendent.
But the relator said that, notwithstanding his said desire and request so communicated to such superintendent as aforesaid, the
superintendent, on or about the 14th of October, 1885, in disregard of the relator's wishes and request, required said Abram
Andrew to participate in the practice and study of music, and upon
the refusal of said Abram Andrew to participate in such exercises
and study, which he did without disrespect to such superintendent,
and entirely because of the relator's direction, which was so communicated to such superintendent as aforesaid, the superintendent
suspended said Abram Andrew from such school, without assigning any cause therefor, other than his refusal to participate in such
musical exercises and studies, and, as the relator averred, without
any legal cause or justification whatever; that such suspension was
reported to, and approved by, such board of school trustees, and the
said Abram Andrew had, in consequence of such suspension, been
thence, hitherto, and still was debarred from attendance upon such
high school as a pupil thereof; that after the promulgation of such
order of suspension, and before the filing of his verified complaint
or affidavit herein, the relator demanded of such board of school
trustees, the revocation of such order of suspension, and that Abram
Andrew be readmitted as a pupil of such high school, which demand
VOL. XXX.-41
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such board, and each member thereof, refused to comply with, but
admitted that no charges of misconduct or insubordination existed
against Abram Andrew, excepting only his refusal to participate in
such musical studies and exercises, in violation of the expressed
wishes of the relator; and so the relator said that his son, Abram
Andrew, was deprived of his right to attend and receive instruction
in such high school, without any reasonable or justifiable cause
whatever. Wherefore, &c.
An alternative writ of mandate was issued by the court. The
appellees appeared and jointly demurred to the relator's verified complaint or affidavit herein, upon the ground that it did not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. This demurrer was sustained by the court. The relator excepted, and, failing to amend,
judgment was rendered against him for appellee's costs. The sustaining of the demurrer to his verified complaint is assigned here as
error by appellant's relator.
We have given a full summary of the facts stated by the relator
in his verified complaint herein almost in the language of the
pleader. It will be seen therefrom that the superintendent of the
free public schools of the city of La Porte, with the sanction of
the trustees of the school city of La Porte, had made a rule or
regulation for the government of the pupils of the high school, in
the graded schools of such city, requiring that each of such pupils
should, at stated intervals, employ a certain period of time in the
study and practice of music, and should provide himself with a
prescribed book for that purpose. The relator's son, Abram Andrew,
was one of the pupils of such high school, and at the instigation
and by the direction of his father he disobeyed or violated such rule
and regulation, and refused to employ any period of time in the
study and practice of music, and to provide himself with the prescribed book or books for the purpose of the study and practice of
music. For his disobedience of such rule or regulation, and his
refusal to comply therewith, the pupil Abram Andrew was promptly
suspended from the high school, and his suspension was approved
by the trustees of the school city of La Porte. This action is
brought by the father and natural guardian of the suspended pupil,
to compel, by mandate, the governing authorities of the school corporation to revoke such suspension, and to re-admit such pupil to
the high school.
The question for our decision in this case, as it seems to us, may
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be thus stated: Is the rule or regulation for the government of the
pupils of the high school of the school city of La Porte, in relation
to the study and practice of music, a valid and reasonable exercise
of the discretionary power conferred by law upon the governing
authorities of such school corporation ? In section 4497, Rev. Stat.
1881, in force since August 16, 1869, it is provided as follows:
"The common schools of the state shall be taught in the English
language; and the trustee shall provide to have taught in them
orthography, reading, writing, arithmetic, geography, English
grammar, physiology, history of the United States, and good behavior, and such other branches of learning, and other languages, as
the advancement of pupils may require, and the trustees from time
to time direct." Under this statutory provision, and others of similar purport and effect, to be found in our school laws, it was competent, we think, for the trustees of the school city of La Porte to
enact necessary and reasonable rules for the government of the
pupils of its high school, directing what branches of learning such
pupils should pursue, and regulating the time to be given to any
particular study, and prescribing what book or books should be used
therein. Such trustees were and are required, by the express provisions of sect. 4444, Rev. Stat. 1881, in force since March 8th,
1873, to "take charge of the educational affairs" of such city of
La Porte; "they may also establish graded schools, or such modifications of them as may be practicable, and provide for admitting
into the higher departments of the graded school, from the primary
schools of their townships, such pupils as are sufficiently advanced
for such admission."
The power to establish graded schools carries with it, of course,
the power to establish and enforce such reasonable rules as may
seem necessary to the trustees, in their discretion, for the government and discipline of such schools, and prescribing the course of
instruction therein. Confining our opinion strictly to the case in
hand, we will consider and decide these two questions, in the order
of their statement, namely : (1) Has the appellant's relator shown,
by the averment of his verified complaint, that the rule or regulation for the government of the pupils of the high school, in the
school city of La Porte, of which he complains, was or is an unreasonable exercise of the discretionary power conferred by law upon
the trustees of such school corporation and the superintendent of
its schools ? (2) Conceding or assuming such rule or regulation to
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be reasonable and valid, has the relator shown, in his complaint
herein, any sufficient or satisfactory excuse for. the non-compliance
therewith, and the disobedience thereof, of his son, Abram Andrew,
a pupil of such high school, or any sufficient or legal ground for the
revocation of the suspension of his son, or for his son's readmission,
as a pupil in such high school?
1. As to the first of these questions, it will be seen from the
relator's verified complaint, the substance of which we have heretofore given, that he has not attempted to show, in any manner, that
the rule or regulation requiring that each of the pupils of the high
school, as one of the exercises prescribed by the superintendent,
with the sanction of the trustees, for the pupils of such school, should
at stated intervals employ a certain period of time in the study and
practice of music, and for that purpose should provide himself with
a prescribed book, was not a reasonable and valid exercise of the
discretionary power conferred by law upon such trustees and superintendent. It cannot be doubted, we think, that the legislature has
given the trustees of the public school corporations the discretionary
power to direct, from time to time, what branches of learning, in
addition to those specified in the statute, shall be taught in the
public schools of their respective corporations. Where such trustees
may have established a system of graded schools, or such modifications of them as may be practicable, within their respective corporations, they are clothed by law with the discretionary power to
prescribe the course of .instruction in the different grades of their
public schools. We are of opinion that the rule or regulation of
which the relator complains in the case under consideration was
within the discretionary power conferred by law upon the governing authorities of the school city of La Porte ; that it was not an
unreasonable rule; but that it was such a one as each pupil of the
high school, in the absence of sufficient excuse, might lawfully be
required to obey and comply with. It will be observed that the
relator has stated the requirements of the rule whereof he complains
with much vagueness and uncertainty- "Each of the pupils shall,
at stated intervals," &c.-what the intervals are, whether once a
week, once a month, or once each term or session, is wholly left to
conjecture--" employ a certain period of time." etc. There is no
period of time more uncertain in duration than the time represented
by the expression " a certain period of time." Was it fifteen min-
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utes, one hour, or one day ? The relator has not informed us. We
pass to the consideration of the second question above stated.
2. The school authorities of the city of La Porte, in the exercise
of the discretionary power conferred on them by lw, adopted a
rule or regulation requiring that each pupil of their high school
should, at stated intervals, employ a certain period of time in the
study and practice of music, and for that purpose should provide
himself with a prescribed book. The relator requested the superintendent of the public schools of the city of La Porte to excuse his
son, Abram Andrew, who was one of the pupils of the high school,
from the study and practice of music at the musical exercises
of such school, and directed his son not to participate in such
musical exercises. The superintendent afterwards required the
relator's son, as one of the pupils of the high school, to take
part in the musical exercises of the school, and, upon his refusal to obey or comply with such requirement, suspended him from
such high school. The only cause or reason assigned by the relator
for requiring his son to disobey such rule or regulation was that he
did not believe it was for the best interest of his son to participate
in the musical studies and exercises of the high school, and did not
wish him to do so. The relator has assigned no cause or reason,
and it may be fairly assumed that he had none, in support either
of his belief or his wish. The important question arises, which
should govern the public high school of the city of La Porte, as to
the branches of learning to be taught, and the course of instruction
therein,-the school trustees of such city, to whom the law has confided the direction of these matters, or the mere arbitrary will of
the relator, without cause or reason in its support ? We are of opinion that only one answer can or ought to be given to this question.
The arbitrary wishes of the relator in the premises must yield and
be subordinated to the governing authorities of the school city of
La Porte, and their reasonable rules and regulations for the government of the pupils of its high school. This is the doctrine of the
cases decided by the courts of last resort in many of our sister
states, and, as applicable to the facts of this case, we think it is
the better doctrine: Roberts v. Boston, 5 Cush. 198 ; Hodgkins v.
Bockport, 105 Mass. 475; Ferriterv. Tyler, 48 Vt. 444; Sewell
v. Board, &c., 29 Ohio St. 89; Donahoe v. Bichards, 88 Me.
879; Guernsey v. Pitkin, 32 Vt. 226; Kidder v. Chellis, 59 N.
H. 473.
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On the other hand, it is notto be denied that the decisions of the
Supreme Courts of Illinois and Wisconsin are in apparent conflict,
to some extent at least, with what we here decide: Morrow v. Wood,
35 Wis. 59; Rulison v. Post, 79 Ill. 567; Trustees, &c.,v. People, 87 Id. 303. There is much in the opinions of those learned
courts, which, applied to the cases before them, meets our approval i
but we think that the doctrine of those cases cannot apply, and
ought not to be applied to the case in hand, as stated by the relator
in his verified complaint herein, to which case we limit this opinion.
For the reasons given, our conclusion is that no error was committed by the court below, in sustaining appellees' demurrer to the
relator's complaint.
The judgment is affirmed, with costs.
The question involved in this case is
one of great importance and interest.
With reference to the general power of a
teacher over his pupil, Blackstone has
well said: "The master is in loco parentis; and has such a portion of the powers
of the parent committed to his charge,
viz. : that of restraint and correction, as
may be necessary to answer the purposes
forwhich he is employed." I BI. Com.
453. See, also, Lander v. Seaver, 32
Vt. 114. He has not all the power of
the parent, and with reference to the
power of both teachers and school
directors, or other officers having the
supervision and control of schools, to
make rules and regulations for the
government of schools, where their
authority is not expressly defined by
statute, it may be said in general terms,
that such rules and regulations must be
reasonable. The teacher has not, nor
have such board of directors, a discretionary power of expulsion, certainly for
reasonable cause: Fitzgerald v. North
cote, 4 Fost. & Fin. 656, 686, per CocKBURN, C. J. ; Rulison v. Post, 79 Il1.
567 ; Guernsey v. Pitkin, 32 Vt. 224;
Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 692; s. c. 13
Am. Law Reg (N. S.) 692.
It may perhaps be conceded that the
legislature has the power to vest the
boards of directors of our public schools

with the power to compel every pupil to
pursue all the studies of a prescribed
course, under penalty of exclusion from
the schools ; but it seems to us that a
grant of such power would be very impolitic and not to be held as granted
unless conferred expressly or by necessary
implication. It does not seem to us that
the provision. of the statute in the principal case that " the common schools of the
state shall be taught in the English language ; and the trustee shall provide to
have taught in them orthography, reading, writing, arithmetic, geography,
English grammar, physiology, history of
the United States, and good behavior,
and such other branches of learning and
other languages, as the advancement of
the pupils may require and the trustees
from time to time direct," requires instruction in all these branches to every
pupil. The statute is obligatory that instruction shall be in the English language
and that the trustee shall afford facilities
for instruction in the enumerated branches. This subject was ably discussed by
COLE, J., in the weIl-considered case of
Morrow v. Mood, supra. Among other
things lie there said : "Certain studies
arc required to be taught in the public
schools, by statute. The rights of one
pupil must be so exercised undoubtedly
as not to prejudice the equal rights of

STATE v. WEBBER.
others. But the parent has the right to
make a reasonable selection from the
prescribed studies for his child to pursue,
and this cannot possibly conflict with the
equal rights of other pupils. * * *

It

is unreasonable to suppose every scholar
who attends school can or will study all
the branches taught in them. 'From the
nature of the case some choice must be
made and some discretion be exercised as
to the studies which the different pupils
shall pursue. The parent is quite as
likely to make a wise and judicious selection as the teacher. At all events, in
case of a difference of opinion between
the parent and teacher upon the subject,
we see no reason for holding that the
views of the teacher must prevail. * **
The statute gives the school board power
to make all needful rules and regulations
for the organization, gradation and government of the school, and the power to
suspend any pupil from the privileges of
the school for non-compliance with the
rules established by them or the teacher
with their consent; and it is not proposed to throw any obstacle in the way
of the performance of these duties. But
these powers and duties can be well fulfilled without denying to the parent all
right to control the education of his children." See, also, Rulison v. Post, 79
Il1. 567 ; Trustees qf Schools v. People,
87 Id. 303. The case last cited is worthy of notice. In that case also the statute authorized the trustees ' to adopt
and enforce all necessary rules and regulations for the management and government of the schools: to direct what
branches of study shall be taught, and
what text-books and apparatus shall be
used, and to enforce uniformity of text
books." In their opinion the court say:
IIHere there is power to decide what
branches of study shall he taught in the
high school, what text-books shall be
used, and to prescribe necessary rules
and regulations for the management and
government of the school; but not to
decide what particular branches of study,

of those decided to be taught, shall be
pursued by each pupil. * * * No particular branch of study is compulsory
upon those who attend school, but schools
are simply provided by the public in
which prescribed branches are taught,
which are free to all within the district between certain ages. In most primary
schools it would be both absurd and impracticable to require every pupil to pursue the same study at the same time.
Discrimination and preference between
different branches of study, until some
degree of advancement is attained, is inevitable-and, afterwards, a due regard
to the interests of the child will alvays
require it in a greater or less degree.
It is not claimed that every pupil attending the high school must pursue
every study taught therein, and manifestly in the absence of legislation expressly requiring this, a regulation to that
effect would be regarded as arbitrary and
unreasonable, and could not, therefore,
receive the sanction of the courts. Conceding that all the branches of study
decided to be taught in the school shall
not necessarily be pursued by every pupil,
we are unable to perceive how it can in
anywise prejudice the school, if one
branch rather than another be omitted
from the course of study of a particular
pupil."
The reasoning of these cases (and lack
of space has compelled the omission of
much that bears directly upon the point)
is, as it seems to the writer, unanswerable. Nor do the cases cited by the court
in support of its decision seem to us to
settle the question contra.
In Guernsey v. Pitkin, it appears that
the father had not requested that his son
be excused from the exercise in question,
viz., writing English compositions.
In Donahue v. Richards, the plaintiff,
who was fifteen years of age, had been
expelled from school for refusing to read
in the school of which she was a member,
the Protestant version of the English
Bible,which had previously been ordered
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by the defendants to be used therein, but
it does not appear that the father had forbidden the plaintiff from reading said
Protestant version, and the court in its
opinion states that "as the suit is by the
child, as her rights only are alleged to be
violated, the conservative religious views
of her father are not involved in the
determination of this suit. He is no
party to it for the purpose of obtaining
compensation, nor is it brought on account of any infraction of his rights."
This case, therefore, while entitled to
some weight upon this question is not an
authoritative determination of the point
involved in the principal case, and is not
conclusive upon the question. See in this
connection the case of Spiller v. Woburn,
12 Allen 127.
In Ferriterv. Tyler, it was held that
the prudential committee of a school district may exclude children from further
attendance upon a term of school, for
absence contrary to the rules thereof,
though such absence was pursuant to the
command of their Roman Catholic parents and by direction of their priest, for
the purpose of attending religious services
The statute
on Corpus Christi day.
charged the committee with the duty of
"adopting all requisite measures for the
inspection, examination and regulation
of the schools, and the improvement of
the scholars in learning, "and the action
of the committee was upheld by the court
on the ground, that the rule in question
was such as was contemplated by the
statutes, so far as its purpose was concerned ; and that the purpose was indispensable to the attainment of the end
proposed by the statutes, both as to the
individual scholar, or as to all others who
might be affected byhis attendance and absence : Morrow v. Wood, was regarded by
the court, not only as not in conflict, but
in harmony, with the other decided cases.
The case of Roberts v. Boston, held
that the school committee might lawfully
provide for the instruction of colored
children, in separate schools, and prohibit their attending other schools.

In Hodgkins v. Rockport, it was held
lawful for misconduct injurious to the
discipline and management of the school.
In Sewell v. Board of Education, it
was held that, where instruction in
rhetoric was given in any grade or department of the public schools and one
of the rules adopted by the board of education was that if any pupil should fail
to be prepared with a rhetorical exercise
at the time appointed therefor, he or she
should, unless excusedfor sickness or other
reasonable cause, be immediately suspended from such department; such rule
was reasonable and valid. It appears,
however, in this case, that the pupil not
only refused to prepare the exercise, but
refused to offer any excuse therefor, so
that the case is not deemed conclusive
upon the question under consideration.
In Kidder v. Chellis, it was held that
if a person teaches a district school without the certificate required by law, however defective his title to the office of
public teacher for that reason may be,
still his authority to govern the school
cannot on that ground be contested by
pupils who attend the school or parents
who send their children to it.
Upon the best consideration, therefore,
that we have been able to give the principal case, it seems to us opposed to the
weight of reason and not supported by
the weight of authority. The rule itself,
if enforced without exception, would demonstrate its own utter absurdity. What,
for example, would be done with the
case of a deaf pupil or one who has no
capacity whatever for music, as iot unfrequently is the case. It would be
quite as sensible to undertake to teach
the harmony of colors to one color blind,
or to make an artist out of one totally
blind. The truth seems to us to he that
the case of Morrow v. Wood, and the
Illinois cases above cited are right upon
principle, and that the principal case is
radically wrong in its construction of the
statute upon which the rule in question
If. D. EWELL.
is founded.
Chicago.
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Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
ROGERS,

PER

PRo. AmI, v. LUDLOW MANUFACTURING COMPANY.

In an action against a manufacturing corporation for injuries received by an employee by reason of a defect in the machine on which he was employed, a request to
instruct the jury "that the making of such ordinary repairs as the machine requires,
and the keeping of it in order, from day to day, may be intrusted to servants ; and
if the master employs competent servants for that purpose,. and supplies them with
suitable means, the master performs his duty," is rightly refused, where there is evidence that the servants employed to repair the machine did not use due care in their
repairs, or in giving warning of danger. In such a case it should be submitted to
the jury whether the defendant had exercised a reasonable supervision over its servants, and over the manner in which the machinery was kept in repair.

TORT by an employee against the defendant corporation, the mas-

ter, to recover damages for an injury received by the plaintiff while
in said employ. The first count charged that the injury was caused
by the failure of the defendant to provide suitable and safe machinery ; the second, by the failure to give plaintiff suitable instructions and proper warnings of danger. At the trial in the superior
court, before ROCKWELL, J., the jury found for the plaintifF, and
the defendant alleged exceptions. The material facts appear in the
opinion.
George H. Stearns, for defendant.
G. Wells and J. B. Carroll, for plaintiff.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FIELD, J.-As we construe the charge of the presiding judge,
and as we think it must have been understood by the jury, we find
nothing in the exceptions that requires comment except the refusalto give the third instruction requested, and the instructions given
in place of it. That request was: "That the making of such ordinary repairs as the machine requires, and the keeping of it in order
from day to day, may be intrusted to servants; and if the master
employs competent servants for that purpose, and supplies them
with suitable means, the master performs his duty." This request
was taken from the opinion in McfeGee v. Boston Cordage Co., 139
Mass. 445, 448, 1 N. E. Rep. 745, with a slight change. In that
opinion it was said "that the making of such ordinary repairs as
the use of the machine required to keep it in order from day to day
VOL. XXXV.-42
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may be intrusted to servants." The request includes all ordinary
repairs which the machine requires, as well as those required to
keep it in order from day to day. Since the law was established in
lParwelt v. Boston and W. -R. Corp., 4 MVetc. 49, that a master is
not liable for an injury to a servant caused by the negligence of a
fellow-servant, because every servant takes, by virtue of his employment, the risk of such an injury, the question has been much discussed how far a master can escape responsibility by delegating the
management of his business to servants. In that case it was said
that "we are far from intending to say that there are no implied
warranties and undertakings arising out of the relation of master and
servant. Whether, for instance, the employer would be responsible
to an engineer for a loss arising from a defective or ill-constructed
steam-engine ; whether this would depend upon an implied warranty
of its goodness and sufficiency, or. upon the fact of wilful misconduct or gross negligence on the part of the employer if a natural
person, or of the superintendent or immediate representative and
managing agent in case of an incorporated company,-are questions
on which we give no opinion." Since that decision it has been
established that it is the duty of the master to take reasonable care
that suitable machinery be provided, that it be kept in proper repair, and that competent servants be employed and retained."
As a corporation must act by natural persons, and as all large
corporations carry on their business by means of servants of different grades, it is manifest that if it is held that tliese are all fellowservants, and that the corporation can delegate the whole duty of
hiring and superintending its servants, and of providing its machinery, and of keeping it in repair, to one or more principal
servants, such as superintendents or managers, the corporation may
escape all responsibility for injuries caused by defective machinery,
except in the few cases where it can be shown that these principal
servants were incompetent, or that the directors of the corporation
or its principal officers knew that the subordinate servants were
incompetent, or that the machinery used was defective. To avoid
this result some courts have held that superintendents or managers
were not fellow-servants with the men employed to work under
them, or that servants employed in one department of the business
were not fellow-servants with those employed in another. Other
courts have held that they were all fellow-servants, but that the
master cannot avoid his obligation to see to it that reasonable care
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shall be exercised in procuring suitable machinery, in keeping it
in repair, and in hiring and in retaining competent servants, by
employing a servant to do these things for him; and that if he
does employ a servant for this purpose, and the servant does not
use due care, the master is responsible.
The tendency of the English courts, before the passage of the
Employers' Liability Act (43 & 44 Vict. c. 42), was to restrict very
much the liability of the master. In Wilson v. Merry, L. R., 1
Sc. & Div. 326-332, it was said by Lord Chancellor CAIRNS that
" what the master is, in my opinion, bound to his servant to do, in
the event of his not personally superintending and directing the
work, is to select some proper and competent person to do so, and
to furnish them with adequate materials and resources for the work.
When he has done this, he has, in my opinion, done all that he is
bound to do." Such a rule makes the liability of the master
depend largely upon the extent of the supervision which he has
undertaken personally to exercise over his business, and recognises
few duties except those which the master has personally undertaken
to perform.
The rule of respondeat superior,as applied to cases like the present, the exception of injuries caused by the negligence of a fellowservant, and the limitation of this exception, have been established
by courts, upon considerations of public policy, as well as of legal
principle which govern cases somewhat analogous. If a master who
takes no personal part in the management of his business has any
duty to perform towards his servants, it is difficult to say that it is
always wholly performed by doing two things, namely, by employing competent servants, and by furnishing ample means. In order
that the business may be properly managed, the servants should not
only be competent, but they should be numerous enough to do, and
they should have the means of doing, whatever ought reasonably to
be done, and such regulations should be established as to insure the
requisite subordination and control, and reasonable intelligence and
care, in the conduct of the business; and it is almost as difficult to
define all the duties of the master in these respects as to define the
duties of a person under other relations. It is not the absolute
duty of the master to furnish suitable machinery; and if he is not
held to warrant that the servants he employs to furnish machinery,
or to keep it in repair, shall always use reasonable care, then the
duty-of a master who does not personally conduct his business, if
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he is under any duty, we think must be to use reasonable care in
the management, and that is to exercise, or have exercised, a reasonable supervision over the conduct of his servants, as well as to use
reasonable care in seeing that his servants are competent, and furnished with suitable means for carrying on the business.
It is settled in this commonwealth that all servants employed by
the same master ina common service are fellow-servants, whatever
may be their grade or rank: Albro v. Agawam Canal Co., 6 Cush.
75; O'Connor v. Roberts, 120 Mass. 227; Walker v.Boston & Af.
Rd., 128 Id. 8; Holden v. FitchburgRd., 129 Id. 268; icDermott v. Boston, 133 Id. 349; .Flynnv. Salem, 134 Id. 351 ; Mackin
v. Boston &' A. Rd., 135 Id. 207. It is also settled that the master
is only bound to use reasonable care in procuring suitable machines,
in keeping them in proper repair, and in hiring and retaining competent servants. The difficult question is, what conduct on the part
of the master satisfies this obligation. This question was carefully
considered in Bolden v. .itchburg Rd., supra. It is there said
that the master "is bound to use reasonable care in selecting his
seivants, and in keeping the engines with which, and the buildings,
places, and structures in, upon, or over which, his business is carried on, in a fit and safe condition, and is liable to any of his servants for injuries suffered by them by reason of his negligence in
this respect. * * * It is difficult, if not impossible, to lay down a
more definite rule applicable to all cases. As to switches or turntables upon the line of a railroad, the employment of suitable
persons to select, construct, or inspect, has been held to satisfy the
obligation of the corporation. * * * On the other hand, where a
locomotive engine in actual use is imperfectly constructed, or is worn
out, it has been held that the fact that the corporation has employed
suitable persons to construct it, or to keep it in repair, does- not, as
matter of law, afford a conclusive defence, but the question is whether, under all these circumstances, the corporation, acting by its
appropriate officers or agents, has used that diligence, and has taken
those precautions, which its duty as master requires." In that case
it was held that there was no evidence that the corporation was
negligent, even if its servants were negligent, in setting up or using
a derrick, but that there was evidence of negligence on the part of
the corporation in permitting the derrick to remain for at least ten
days by the side of the track.
In Johnson v. Boston Tow-boat Co., 135 Mass. 209, and in Elmer
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v. Locke, Id. 576, many of the cases were reviewed, and the general principle declared in Hfolden v. Fitcl burg Bd., was so applied
that in one case the corporation was found not to be liable, and in
the other to be liable to its servants.
In Lawless v. Connecticut River Rd., 136 Mass. 1, it was held
that it was the defendant's duty to furnish a suitable locomotive,
and that "it did not necessarily discharge this duty by intrusting
it to suitable servants and agents, but was responsible for the negligence or want of ordinary care of such servants and agents in the
performance of the duty required of them."
In Spicer v. South Boston Iron Co., 138 Mass. 426, the plaintiff,
a servant of the defendant, was injured by the breaking of a hook,
and there was evidence that there was a visible crack or flaw in the
hook which a careful inspection would have revealed, and it was
held that there was evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant corporation.
geaee v. Boston Cordage 0o., ubi supra, there was no eviIn
dence that the machine was not a suitable one, or in good repair,
until it became entangled with hemp at the time the plaintiff was
using it, and the necessity of remedying this was incidental to the
use of the machine.
These decisions show that it is the duty of the master to exercise
a reasonable supervision over the condition in which the machinery,
structures and other appliances used in his business are kept by his
servants, and that he cannot wholly escape responsibility by delegating the performance of this duty to servants; that the negligence
of his servants in repairing or in failing to repair machinery is not
necessarily the negligence of the master, but that it is also to be
determined, in each case, whether the master has exercised a reasonable supervision over his servants, and reasonable care in seeing
that his machinery is kept in proper condition, although he may
have employed competent servants, and furnished them with suitable materials, and instructed them to keep the machinery in repair.
As was said in Johnson v. Boston Tow-boat Co., supra, p. 215:
"1The master is liable in all cases for his own negligence, and that
may be shown by a defect of such a nature, or so long continued, as
to be of itself evidence of negligence in the master, or the negligence of a servant may be of such a character that negligence of
the master may be inferred from it." We are aware that this rule
is somewhat indefinite, and is, perhaps, not precisely the law as it
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is generally declared in the United States: .Northern .Pac. Rd. v.
Herbert,116 U. S. 642, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 590; Benzing v. Steinway, 101 N. Y. 547, 5 N. E. Rep. 449.
There was evidence in the case at bar that the " worker," at the
time the plaintiff was set to work upon it, had been for a long time
in a condition which made it dangerous to one picking it while in
motion. To put the "worker" into a safe condition to be picked
while in motion it was necessary to take off the lags which were
broken, or had cracks or holes in them, and to screw on new lags.
The danger was that, if there were cracks or holes in the lags, the
pick might get caught, and the hand of the person picking might
be drawn between the rollers. The defendant's servants whose
duty it was to keep the machine in repair apparently only renewed
the lags when the teeth were so far broken or bent that the machine
did not do good work, and did not consider that the danger of picking the " worker," if there were holes or cracks in the lags, was a
reason why new lags should be put on. The court could not properly give the instruction requested in a case where the evidence
tended to show a long-continued defect in the machine, which rendered it dangerbus, and a habit on the part of the defendant's
servants to renew the lags only when the machine ceased to do good
work, and without regard to its condition as a dangerous machine.
It was a question for the jury whether the defendant used reasonable care in supervising its servants who were employed to repair
the machine, and in ascertaining the condition in which its machinery was kept, as well as whether these servants used due care
in inspecting the machine from time to time, and in repairing it,
or in giving persons using it warning of danger if the-condition of
the machine made it dangerous. If these servants used all the
care that was reasonably required in keeping the machine in proper
condition, the defendant is not liable, unless it knew of the defect,
and unreasonably neglected to remedy it, or to give notice of the
danger. If these servants did not use all the care that was reasonably required, it was for the jury to say whether the defendant had
exercised a reasonable supervision over its servants, and over the
manner in which the machinery was kept .nrepair.
We think that the instructions given by the presiding justice were
substantially in accordance with this view of the law. The sentence
that "it must appear that all these have done their duty," may
fairly be taken to mean that either the servants must have used due

